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Abstract 
This paper deliberates on the re-designing of the financial system in Japan, 
currently ailing seriously.  With four conditions in the background ― enhanced 
capability of risk transfer through financial markets, increased participation costs in 
the financial markets, increases in probabilities of systemic risks, and the pattern of   
wealth distribution, we will argue the followings: (i) Risk management would make 
more use of risk elimination by institutional investors and risk transfers through 
the financial markets.  It is urgently needed to promote efficient system of risk 
transfer through financial intermediaries.  (ii) Financial market transaction is an 
area for institutional investors; not suited for individual investors. (iii) It is necessary 
to establish an institutional framework to promote active corporate monitoring by 
institutional investors, who are also principal shareholders. (iv) Banks will play an 
important role in financing small and medium size firms, - in particular venture 
firms, when probabilities of systemic risks are alleviated in the future.  In this 
sense, banking is in a state of evolution rather than outright decline.  As a policy 
conclusion, we will stress the importance of participation by individual investors in 
the mechanism of risk transfers through security market-based intermediation. 
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  11.  Introduction 
 
     Ever since Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto introduced new plans for financial 
sector reform in 1996, the financial system of Japan has undergone dramatic changes.  The 
reform plan known as the Financial Big Bang in Japan, covered wide areas in finance.    It called 
for the liberalization of asset management businesses such as trust banks, insurance 
companies, and investment trust companies.  The plan also included reforms for the 
promotion of capital markets, the reduction of entry barriers in various financial institutions, 
and new regulations for sound management of the banking system.  The Big Bang was 
intended to promote fair and free financial system based on accepted global standards.  It 
was motivated by the recognition that the prolonged crisis in the financial system was rooted 
in the inefficiency of the financial markets; more precisely, in the lack of market competition 
and in the opaque policies of the Ministry of Finance (Horiuchi (2000)). 
     Despite the broad coverage of the reforms, the Big Bang did not bring forth the 
concrete blueprint of the Japanese financial system.  The plan emphasized the importance 
of financial markets while at the same time, reiterated the need to equip the banking system 
with sound policies.    It encouraged individual investor participation in the capital markets as 
it tried to strengthen measures in promoting institutional investment.    However, the plan did 
not provide a clear answer to two key questions: whether the Japanese financial system should 
reduce its dependence on the banking system and whether the major capital market players 
should be individual investors. 
     This paper will attempt to address these questions and to identify the future Japanese 
financial system architecture.    We will follow the functional perspectives (Merton and Bodie 
(1995)), rather than the institutional perspectives.  In designing the architecture of the 
Japanese financial system, the institution nevertheless matters greatly when we take into 
consideration factors such as participation costs and state of information technologies.    For 
example, as Allen and Santamero (1998) argues, while the recent development of financial 
technology has reduced the trading costs of financial transaction significantly, it has increased 
participation costs considerably.  This has meant that many sophisticated financial 
transactions have become beyond the capacity of ordinary individuals.  In this case 
individuals cannot participate in the financial markets without the help of institutional 
investors.  Moreover, the rapid development of new industrial technologies has caused 
diversity of opinion among asset holders in regards to various investment opportunities, as 
emphasized by Allen and Gale (2000). In turn, this renders the market-based financial system 
more efficient than the one based on intermediaries.         
            For the sake of simplicity, we will classify financial institutions into two groups: banks 
and institutional investors.  The criterion used to differentiate between the two groups is 
whether the institutions are themselves risk-bearers such as banks, or if they simply transfer 
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immune from oversimplification.    Although the traditional role played by banks has been to 
eliminate or to avoid risks, the banking system nowadays actively engages in risk transfer 
activities.  As Boots and Thakor (2000) argues, banks deal with relationship loans as well as 
transaction loans.  Mortgage loans are a good example of the latter.  Banks act as 
originators and servicers through loan securitization.  The risks are simply transferred from 
the banks to the purchaser of the new securities rather than being absorbed by the banks 
themselves. 
For some institutional investors such as life insurance companies, the risks are not 
unilaterally accepted.  Frequently, they are passed onto the consumers in the form of 
changing rates of return.  Similarly, corporate pension funds with fixed interest payments 
bear risks in principle, although payments vary depending on the earning ability of the firms 
that hold the funds.   
     We will accept four phenomena as basic backdrops for new financial system: (i) the 
enhanced capability of financial market transaction to redistribute and transfer risks, (ii) the 
sharp increase in participation costs for the financial markets owing to sophisticated financial 
instruments and technology, (iii) the rise in systemic risks due to structural changes in the 
industrial structure and related bank lending practices, and (iv) the peculiar features in 
Japanese wealth distribution, where most of financial assets are held by retired people. 
     The first two are global phenomena, and they are the major driving forces in 
converting the world’s financial systems from a bank-based or relationship-based system to a 
market-based or transaction-based system.  New methods to transfer risk comprise of 
bundling and unbundling of risks in financial contracts.    Risks are redistributed and adjusted 
according to the type of risks preferred by the investor. These methods have become 
available owing to financial innovations and information technology (IT). Nonetheless, 
sophisticated IT-based financial technologies have significantly raised participation costs in 
market transactions. Without a certain amount of expertise, participation by the average 
individual investor is virtually impossible. 
    The last two are conditions peculiar to Japan and also to some extent, other Asian 
countries.
1  The 1980s and 1990s have ushered in changes to Japan’s industrial structure 
from heavy and chemical industries to information and knowledge-based industries.    Such a 
large-scale shift in industrial structure is closely related to Japan’s economic history.  Being 
behind other Western industrialized countries, the country had to play catch-up without the 
benefit of learning from an industrialized neighbor or to be engaging in division of labor.  
Consequently, Japan had to develop all the components of heavy industries and military on 
its own.    Since firms in heavy and chemical industries were endowed with ample amount of 
                                                    
1  Catching-up and shared growth are common characteristics in many East Asian economies. 
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As Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) opines, a local shock in productivity would lead to a significant 
spillover in the entire economy.  In other words, together with the relation-specific firm 
behavior, a fall in collateral prices amplified local shocks to systemic and non-diversifiable 
risks.  The banks had no choice but to absorb the risks as they did not have any hedging 
instruments. 
          The fourth point is the pattern of wealth distribution.  Unlike the case of the U.S. and   
pre-war Japan, post-war Japan enjoys a remarkably equal distribution of income and wealth.  
Moreover, it will be shown below that the sizable private financial assets are mostly held by a 
segment of retired people, who are more or less risk-averse and lack expertise in financial 
transactions.    We will argue that the current state of wealth distribution or its future pattern 
is a crucial condition in re-designing the financial system.    The effects of participation costs 
and risk redistribution are highly dependent on wealth distribution. 
     Against these four points, we will deliberate the architecture of the new financial 
system.  Our main conclusion is concerned with the problem of who should be the main 
player in the risk transfer mechanism of the new financial system.    In order to deal with this 
problem we will consider four scenarios derived from the level of participation costs and the 
type of wealth distribution.  A choice among these scenarios depends on the empirical 
examination of participation costs as well as the judgment on the adequate degree of wealth 
distribution in the foreseeable future.   (i) When participation costs are low and wealth 
distribution is unequal, the financial system should be based on markets with active 
participations by individual investors. (ii) When participation costs are high and wealth 
distribution is equal, intermediaries should be the main players in the financial markets.    (iii) 
In either case when participation costs is low and wealth distribution is equal or vice versa, 
financial market transactions should be conducted by means of an adequate mixture of 
individual investors and intermediaries.     
     Through an examination of participation costs and judgment on the type of wealth 
distribution in the near future, we consider that the second scenario is most likely to prevail in 
the Japanese financial system in the era of security market-based financial system.   In other 
words, we argue that neither bank-centered financial intermediation system, nor security 
market-based system relying on individual investors, is adequate.  The architecture of the 
new financial system for the Japanese economy should be established on the principle of 
security market-based intermediation.   
       We consider that a proper division of labor and coordination among various types of 
intermediaries — banks and institutional investors — are needed in order to conduct 
transfers of financial risks effectively.   The division of labor is indispensable partly because   
cyclical pattern in the changes of diversifiable and non-diversifiable risks exist and partly 
because global trend of synchronization of industrial activities tends to enhance the systemic 
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trading, there remains room to avoid and eliminate risks by means of diversified portfolio 
holding and close monitoring.  More solid empirical and theoretical evidences are needed 
nonetheless, we feel that the following actions are necessary. 
     First, the capability of Japanese banks to eliminate risks has been reduced.  It is 
urgent to introduce alternative measures to cope with risks.  These include elimination, 
redistribution, and transfers of risks. 
     Second, with respect to intermediation by institutional investors, we need to establish 
institutional and legal frameworks in order to implement effective corporate governance.  
Despite the development of IT, information asymmetry related to the principal-agent 
problem remains in the financial system and difficulties related to contingent contract cannot 
be eliminated.  Corporate governance has been carried out by relationship banking, but we 
feel it should be complemented by the “voice” from institutional investors as principal 
shareholders.   
     Third, the current plight of the Japanese banking system is partly due to competition 
from the market-based financial system that reduces the rent in relationship lending.  It is 
also in part due to the current state of risks that has become systemic and non-diversifiable.  
There exists both cyclical and trend movements in the changing pattern of risks.    As a trend, 
the nature of risk seems to be getting more systemic.    Consequently, together with the trend 
of IT development which makes banking technology more and more obsolete, there is no 
denying that the role of the banking sector is being diminished.   
     Yet systemic risk is cyclical as well, as seen from the experience during the 1920s. 
Hence the importance of banking may arise again when risks become less systemic and more 
diversifiable.  In addition, the banking sector can fulfill its important role in assisting small 
and medium-size firms, i.e. venture firms, in financing  local  economic  activities.            
          Section 2 provides a theoretical basis for the proposal of the new architecture through 
examination of the relationship between key concepts.  These concepts are participation 
costs, wealth distribution, and information asymmetry.  We will at first offer some evidence 
on the rise of participation costs in the recent financial markets, then focus on participation 
costs and wealth distribution in which alternative scenarios will be discussed.     
Section 3 deals with the changing role of the banking sector in Japan.  At first, we 
examine the role of bank deposits as the key instrument in the store of value for the Japanese 
household.  Through an examination of detailed data on the age distribution of financial 
wealth as well as portfolio selection of different age groups, we will argue why bank deposits 
have been so important for the Japanese households.  We will then discuss whether the 
risk-taking role of banks has declined.  By paying attention to the cyclical nature in the  
historical pattern of risk, the Japanese banking system is experiencing not only long-term 
financial technological changes - which tend to replace the traditional banking technologies 
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historical development phases of Japan. 
Section 4 is devoted to a detailed examination of the new direction of changes in the 
Japanese financial system.  This section will examine the phenomenon of the declining role 
of the banking sector, the insufficiency of the development in the securitized assets market, 
and the difficulties involving individual investors in the security markets.  Later, this section 
will draw attention to the new phenomenon and possibility of corporate governance through 
intermediated ownership.  We make a strong claim for the necessity of restructuring the 
Japanese financial markets to accommodate securities market-based intermediation.  Finally, 
Section 5 provides an overview of the desirable financial system in Japan.    The Appendix is 
concerned with risk transfer in historical perspective.     
 
2.    Participation Costs and Wealth Distribution 
 
     In an insightful review on the state of intermediation theory, Allen and Santamero 
(1998 and 2001) argue that the existing theory of financial intermediation focuses on 
functions no longer important to the new financial environments based on new information 
technology and globalization of the financial markets.    Instead of emphasizing the roles of 
asymmetric information and transaction costs as the raison d’être for banking institutions, the 
authors point out two new functions of the financial system.  First, the major role of the 
financial intermediaries lies not in the elimination and avoidance of risks, but in the trade and 
transfer of risks.  Second, owing to rapid innovations in financial technology, participation 
costs in financial transaction have increased significantly.  Therefore, the new and critical 
role of financial intermediations lies in reducing these costs.     
     Based on these two propositions regarding the functions of financial systems, Allen 
and Santamero further derive two important observations on the institutional characteristics 
of financial systems: (i) Financial market transaction is beyond the capacity of individual 
investors owing to high participation costs.  Intermediaries should be the major players in 
the market. (ii) In economies with weak market competition, the banking sector should be the 
risk-transferring agent. The Japanese, German, and French banking sectors have historically 
fulfilled this role by way of intertemporal risk-smoothing; transferring risks from generation 
to generation.   
     It is indispensable to pay attention to the state of wealth distribution along with 
discussions on the concept of participation and transaction costs.    We discuss this point and 
derive alternative scenarios for attracting more participants in the markets.  It is especially 
important to understand differences between the Japanese financial system and its U.S. 
counterpart.   
     A case for utilization of intermediaries in financial market transactions seems to be 
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to investment in the financial markets directly.  Before presenting detailed discussion on 
alternative scenarios regarding participation costs and wealth distribution, the next section 
provides some evidence on the magnitude of participation costs. 
 
2.1 How Large are the Participation Costs? 
     In  order  to  confirm  whether  participation  costs in financial markets have actually risen, 
we first examine the impact of IT on information costs in the financial markets.    We do not 
believe that IT has reduced monitoring costs or alleviated information asymmetry in the 
market.  Rather, IT has lowered trading costs considerably.  Assuming that costs in the 
financial system are composed of trading costs, monitoring costs and participating costs, we 
find that there is evidence for a recent, significant rise  in  participation  costs.            
     While it is true that recent developments of financial technology have reduced 
transaction costs, the developments do not necessarily imply a reduction in costs of corporate 
governance or monitoring.  This is particularly true with respect to information and 
communication costs in asset management.    There is also a lack of evidence to suggest that 
the cost of writing contracts and the cost of acquiring information have fallen. 
     The nature of recent changes in IT and their impact on the financial system are 
succinctly summarized in Bank of Japan (2001) and Baba and Hisada (2002).  Three main 
points of the IT innovation are:  (i) Innovation based on the integration of information 
processing technology and communication technology. (ii) Significant speeding-up, cost 
reduction and globalization of processing and transmitting information. (iii) The rapid 
diffusion of the innovation throughout the world.   
     These innovations have the following impacts on the financial system.
2  First, IT 
strengthens the functions of capital markets.    It broadens the range of financial instruments 
tradable on the markets, owing to its exact specification of the risk-return profile of financial 
assets, and to the bundling and unbundling of risk-return features.  Second, through 
reductions in entry cost, it influences the competitiveness and industrial organization of the 
banking industry.
3    Third, owing to IT’s economies of scale, it can accelerate changes in the 
industrial structure and organization of the entire financial industry by facilitating merger and 
acquisition activities across various institutions.   
     In this regard, enhanced competition in the banking industry either through the 
pressure from the financial markets or though new competitors in the banking industry may 
                                                    
2  The fourth possible impact is on the payment system through the development of electronic money.  
The Bank of Japan (2001) developed a detailed examination on the impact focusing on the general 
acceptability and finality of electronic money.   
3  Internet banking is the case in point: two Internet banks were established; Japan Net Bank in October 
2000 and Sony Bank in June 2001. 
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Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that the degree of competition within the banking industry 
and among different financial markets affects incentives to invest in information processing 
capacity by the banks.  Thus we see the different levels of relationship banking vis-à-vis 
transaction banking.  Nevertheless, the innovation has little to do with improving the 
efficiency of such investments. 
     An important part of this kind of investment takes the form of human capital 
investment.    For many companies, IT can reduce costly on-the-job training.    However, the 
effect of IT on the efficiency of such training is quite different and perhaps negligible in 
comparison with its effects on the asset transaction efficiency in the capital markets. 
     Allen and Santamero (1998) and Mishkin and Strahan (1999) emphasize that the 
development of IT has made it easier to “screen out good from bad credit risks or to 
monitor corporations, thus reducing the adverse selection and moral hazard problem” 
(Mishkin and Strahan (1999, p.5).   But they fail to explain how adverse selection and moral 
hazard are prevented by the use of the technology.  Mishkin and Strahan (1999) refer to 
credit-scoring models by which loans to small firms are standardized and in some cases 
securitized.  This kind of pooling technique has very little to do with improvement of 
individual firm monitoring.     
     Likewise, issuance of asset-backed securities by banks based on the future income on 
lease contracts, auto credits, consumer credits and mortgage loans does not necessarily reduce 
the credit risk of the banks.  Although it is true that particular risks related to lease credits, 
moragage and so on are transferable to outside investors, there is a risk of moral hazard in 
activities which risks could not be securitized.    In the case of project financing, banks could 
be freed from risks related to particular projects.  However, firms are not a simple sum of 
individual projects.  Risks related to the remaining coordinating sections, or management 
parts of the firms, may not be easily transferred via project financing.  There is always the 
possibility of agency costs between firm managers and fund providers to the firms.  The 
monitoring of managers through personal communications is still indispensable.  Basic 
information asymmetry between financiers and corporate managers remains a crucial 
problem for financial intermediaries.   
          IT has not eliminated the contract costs.    Hart (1995) refers to three kinds of contract 
costs: costs to think far ahead and to plan all contingencies, costs to negotiate about those 
plans among contracting parties, and costs to write the plans down for each contingencies.  
Since IT is not capable of reducing these costs, the difficulties in writing contingent 
contracts will persist, and the contracts will be left incomplete, leaving the principal-agent 
problems intact.  Information production through continuous communication is of vital 
importance  in  realizing  good  corporate  governance.        
     It must be made clear that it is not our intention to deny all the positive effects of IT 
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markets have had some indirect effects on the degree of information asymmetry in corporate 
management.  For example, widely accepted rules in the area of accounting (integrated 
accounting system and market-price based accounting system) have enhanced transparency 
and reduced agency costs.   Secondly, stockholder sovereignty in the global financial markets 
has intensified to a certain extent, resulting in the reduction of agency costs between 
financiers and manager due to disciplinary pressures exerted by stockholders. 
     Let us move on to the estimation of participation costs.  For this purpose it is 
necessary to conceptualize the cost structure related to financial market activities.  The 
financial market activity consists of the trading of various financial instruments in order to 
mobilize savings from surplus units to deficit units.  Trading of financial instruments 
requires three kinds of market costs: (a) Costs to present demand schedule for each financial 
instrument in a way to be effectively contracted and traded.  (b) Costs to present supply 
schedule for each financial instruments in a way to be effectively contracted and traded. (c) 
Costs to execute the trade and enforce contracts.    In a world with only direct securities, cost 
(a) is incurred by surplus units, and (b) by deficit units.  In a world with both direct and 
indirect securities issued by financial intermediaries, part of costs (a) and (b) are born also by 
financial institutions.  Cost (a) is composed of many things such as expenses incurred in 
evaluating various financial instruments, costs to get basic expertise in trading, and expenses 
incurred by consulting and advising services et cetera.    Likewise, cost (b) comprises of many 
things such as expenses in monitoring and information processing, costs information 
disclosure and signaling, and expenses involved in the negotiation and preparing of contracts, 
and so on.    Cost (c) covers trade execution costs by financial intermediaries, stock exchanges, 
and regulatory agencies.  For simplicity, we will refer to cost (a) participation costs, (b) 
monitoring costs, and (c) trading costs.   
         Although we do not have comprehensive evidence on significant reductions in trading 
cost benefited by improvements in IT, we will conditionally accept this proposition.  
Evidence is in the decline of brokerage commission for stock transactions.    In Japan, trading 
fee was deregulated on October 1, 1999.  Table 1 confirms that after October 1987 
regulated trading fee declined steadily reflecting the enhanced efficient of security transaction 
and in the anticipation of financial liberalization.  For each blanket of transaction volume 
either proportional or fixed, part of handling costs declined.    This is particularly evident for 
large volume transactions.  Table 2 shows average handling costs charged on customers 
based on the survey covering 190 security companies.    Percentages declined during the years 
2000 to 2001, there were small increases from 2001 to 2002.  This seems to imply that 
trading fee on average, has already reached the equilibrium value from 1999 to 2001.  It 
must be noted however, that the level and formula of charging trading fees have varied 
considerably among securities companies.  Each firm has tried to offer its best price 
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on-line e-trading has decreased trading fee considerably for small volume transactions, 
although we do not have comprehensive data to back up this claim.         
         As for the costs related to the monitoring of borrowers, it has often been argued that 
such costs too, have declined.  We do not agree with this view completely, although we 
accept the fact that there is no evidence of increases in such costs. 
          Let us regard GDP or value-added in the financial service industry as the total costs of 
financial activities.  Table 3 show that the share of the financial service industry (financial 
institutions and insurance companies) in GDP terms has risen continuously until the end of 
the bubble economy in the late 1980s.  A decade later, a similar trend has been repeated in 
the U.S.  It is interesting to note that the share was higher in Japan until the late 1980s, and 
then exceeded by the U.S. during the 1990s.  We do not have any additional information to 
explain these differences nevertheless, the message of Table 3 is clear.    Though trading costs 
and monitoring costs have not increased continuously, the increases in the total costs of 
financial sector activities are evidence for increases in the participation costs. 
          Table 4, 5 and 6 provide some evidence on increases in the participation costs.    Table 
4 shows that a percentage share of security analysts in the total employees of security 
industry has increased rapidly during the 1990s in Japan.    A similar trend exists with respect 
to a percentage share of security analysts in the total employees of total finance and 
insurance industries.  The number of analysts per listed firm (including over-the-counter 
trading) poses a similar trend.  Table 5 confirms a similar trend in the U.S. with respects to 
the share of analysts in the total finance and insurance industry employees and the number 
of analysts per public company.    While Tables 4 and 5 are related to consulting costs, Table 
6 gives data on education costs, namely annual tuition of the top-three U.S. business schools 
and salary comparisons of the students before entering and after graduating from the schools.     
Tuition costs for an MBA education can be substantial, and so can the rewards.    Post-MBA 
salary is almost three times greater than pre-MBA salary.  The high cost of tuition can be 
construed as an evidence for high participation costs in the financial markets.  Holders of 
MBA degrees are considered to possess expertise in business administration and in 
sophisticated financial transaction.  In the example of Keio University Business School, 
annual tuition amounts to $18,950 U.S. dollars (converted by the exchange rate ¥130 yen/U.S. 
dollar).  According to the ongoing pay scale of many Japanese companies, the reward for 
possessing an MBA degree is considerably less when compared with their American 
counterparts.  Graduates of Japan MBA programs enjoy slightly higher salaries than their 




  102.2 Wealth Distribution and the Financial System 
     The state of income and asset distribution has significant influence on the 
development of the financial system in two respects: risk aversion and participation costs.     
     As Friedman and Savage (1963), and Arrow (1965) have opined, the level of asset 
accumulation is closely related to the degree of risk aversion.  Other things being equal, 
people are less risk-averse as they become wealthier.  This has important implication in 
considering the functions of the financial system.  For an economy with relatively even 
wealth distribution, it is not easy to trade risks since the degree of risk aversion is 
homogeneous, while risk trading and risk redistribution is easier for an economy with unequal 
income and wealth distribution.   
     Wealth distribution also has important bearings on the role of participation costs in 
implementing various functions of the financial system.  Allen and Santamero (1998, 2001) 
emphasize that because of the degree of sophistication and specialization required to 
undertake complex risk trading and risk management operations, the participation costs in 
recent years have risen sharply.  Participation costs are shared among asset holders or 
surplus units, financial intermediaries, and related various service industries.  However, here 
we are concerned with participation costs born by assets holders only.  When the level of 
asset accumulation is low and/or when wealth is evenly distributed among individuals, 
average fixed participation costs would be higher, and makes it more difficult to conduct risk 
trading by individuals.  In such a case it is necessary to promote institutional investors or 
asset management institutions to share the participation costs through economy of scale in 
transaction.  Conversely, when income and wealth distribution are skewed, the rich can 
afford to pay the participation costs, partly taking up risk trading among themselves.   
     The following scheme shows alternative scenarios for the participants in the financial 
m a r k e t   t r a n s a c t i o n .        
          If an economy is located at the north-west cell in Table 7, where participation costs are 
high and wealth is equally distributed, financial intermediaries should be the major players in 
the financial markets.  This corresponds to contemporary Japan.  In the south-east cell 
where participation costs are low and wealth is distributed unequally, rich individual investors 
are able to fulfill the central role in transferring financial risks.    In either the north-east or the 
south-west cell, financial market activities are carried out by a mix of financial intermediaries 
and individual investors.  Whether or not the U.S. is located in the south-east cell is an 
interesting question to be examined empirically.    Whenever participation costs are high as is 
indicated above, the U.S. would actually be, located in the south-west cell along with the active 
participation of individuals in the financial markets. 
     Participation costs depend on the development of financial technology, while wealth 
distribution could be redirected through taxation and education policies.  Therefore the 
choice among cells depends not only on value judgments relating to the socio-economic 
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If Japan were to become a society with less equal ex post income and wealth distribution that 
is partially necessary for the activation of society, we could aim at a financial system with 
active individual participations.   If we consider that the current state of income and wealth 
distribution should be maintained in the foreseeable future, we might need to establish 
market system intermediated by institutional investors and banks. 
     The relationship between participation costs and wealth distribution is important 
because there seems to be huge set-up or fixed costs included as part of participation costs.  
Since there is a scale economy in the consulting and learning activities, it is indispensable to 
consider the relationship between the costs and the levels of wealth.  In order to illustrate 
the relationship of participation costs and wealth distribution, consider the following example.   
An individual investor with asset A (yen) faces a choice to invest his assets on his own or 
through the help of institutional investors.    Let us assume that it is once and for all portfolio 
choice
4  and that an institutional investor can arrive at an optimal portfolio choice.    We need 
to solve for his cost if he tries to arrive at the same optimal portfolio choice as that of the 
institutional investor.  Total costs when he delegates the job to an institutional investor is 
given as 
       a   +   b A                                                         (1) 
Where b denotes a proportional trading fee and a is a fixed (lumpsome) fee.  This implies 
that total trading fee increases as total assets increase, although average fee declines.  The 
institutional investor faced with a large block of asset must consider new investment 
opportunities in the environment of relaxed constraints.  Consequently, the institutional 
investors must use more human and data resources to collect information and conduct 
monitoring.   
     On the other hand, in the case of an individual investor who chooses portfolio by 
himself, his participation costs comprise the opportunity costs of labor   
     wT                                                              ( 2 )  
where w denotes his wage level and T the time required to conduct the portfolio selection.  
This participation costs reflect costs to acquire expertise in participating complex financial 
transactions.    We assume that T is composed of two parts, c and dA, i.e. 
     T   =   c +dA                                                       ( 3 )  
Where  c  is a fixed component and d is a proportional component.  A proportional 
component arises because as the size of total assets become larger, an individual investor 
incurs more information and monitoring costs.  With a small A, he may have to obtain 
                                                    
4  Allen and Santomero (1998) refers to continuous transaction on a day to day basis (op. cit., p.1481).  
However, as the introduction of dynamic aspects of portfolio selection is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we confine ourselves only to a once and for all selection. 
  12information about listed firms and mutual funds in the newspapers.  With a slightly bigger 
A, he may want to have information about investment opportunities abroad.    With an even 
larger A, he might need private information about Silicon Valley entrepreneurs.    Finally, with 
a very large A, he would need data about investment strategies of hedge funds.  cw shows 
fixed costs to participate in the financial market transaction.  Allen and Santomero (1998, 
2001) argues that a rapid increase in cw vis-à-vis a is one of the basic characteristics of the 
modern financial system. 
            The investor will delegate the transaction to institutional investors if a +bA is smaller 
than w(c +dA) or  b
A
a
  is smaller than dw
A
cw
 , and conduct the transaction by himself if  
a + bA    is greater than w(c + dA) or  b
A
a
   is greater than  dw
A
cw
 .   
     In an economy with skewed wealth distribution, the wealth level of representative 
investor could be large. The comparison between the two terms would be dominated by a 
comparison between b and dw 
5.  In this economy, those not earning wage incomes will 
certainly choose to implement portfolio choice by themselves.  This is the typical case of 
classical rentier depicted in J. M Keynes’ General Theory.  Retired rich investors also prefer to 
select their portfolio by themselves.  However, Bill Gates, whose w is very high, would 
delegate the business to institutional investors or professionals as Allen (2001) mentions. 
        On the other hand in an economy with equal wealth distribution, the comparison will 
be dominated by the comparison between a and cw.  c would be very large for those who 
lack basic knowledge of financial instruments and IT.  Even if w is small, individuals will 
choose institutional investors when c is sufficiently large as compared with a, owing to the 
sophistication of financial technology and the transaction economy of scale that is provided 
by institutional investors.  This case corresponds to the current environment in Japan as 
most of the financial assets are held by a segment of retirees receiving large retirement 
payments.    It must be noted that even for the educated young, the cw is an opportunity cost, 
i.e. lost employment income from participants in the MBA studies (Table 6).       
      Mankiew and Zeldes (1991) has clearly pointed out the dependence on fixed 
participation costs or fixed information costs in regards to the level of wealth. Using the 1984 
family survey data, it can be understood that higher-income families were more likely to pay 
the fixed costs because of their larger portfolios.  The fraction of U.S. families that held 
stock in 1984 increased with the level of average labor income.    Noted that in Mankiew and 
Zeldes (1991), labor income is not treated as opportunity costs of information acquisition 
activities but a surrogate variable for the level of wealth. 
      
                                                    
5  For simplicity, consider the case where A is infinite. 
  133.    The Banking Sector in Japan     
 
     In discussing the new architecture of the financial system, the restructuring of the 
banking sector is crucial in Japan.  Throughout the postwar years, banks have played 
important roles in providing households with safe storage of value.  They have also 
encouraged relation-specific investments by workers and related-firms. 
          This section will investigate the state of banking industry from three angles.    First, we 
examine why the share of bank deposits in household portfolios has been so high.  This 
phenomenon is due to wealth equality, skewed wealth distribution among different age 
groups, and government protection of deposits in the so-called convoy system.    Second, we 
discuss why the non-performing asset problem has become so serious in Japan.    In addition 
to the ramifications of the asset bubble and financial policy muddle, we will also point out 
significant trend and cyclical factors that explain the current plight of the banking industry.     
      
3.1 Why is the Deposit Ratio so high in Japan? 
     At first, let us examine how households allocate their savings into different financial 
and real assets.  We will also look at how income and wealth are distributed.  Broadly 
speaking, both household assets and liabilities have increased since 1970, with gross financial 
assets rising from around 98% of GDP in 1970 to over 252% in 1998.  The liabilities have 
increased from under 40% to around 77%.  Net financial wealth, as a result, has risen 
strongly from 60% of GDP in 1970 to 115% in 1998. 
     Table 8 provides a comprehensive picture of household portfolio selection in 
comparative and historical perspective.  As a general trend among G7 countries, we can 
observe the following.    (i) The share of deposits has declined over time except for Japan. (ii) 
The share of equities held by households has declined in the U.K., the U.S., Germany, and 
Japan while it has increased in Canada, France, and Italy. (iii) The share of claims on 
institutions has increased in all G7 countries. 
Table 9 shows the trend of personal sector (household plus unincorporated 
businesses)
6 portfolio selection in more detail for Japan and confirms the characteristics 
mentioned earlier.  It can also be understood that although the share of deposits is almost 
constant since 1970, the share of bank deposits declined during the 1990s, with the offsetting 
increase in postal savings.    We will return to this point in the next section. 
     Overall, the share of deposits including postal savings is exceptionally high in Japan.  
Table 10 compares the level of composition of financial assets in Japan with the U.S., the 
U.K., Germany, and France.    The percentage of cash and deposits is 54.0% in Japan. This is 
                                                    
6 Since Table 9 is based on flow of funds account, the household of Japan in the table is the personal 
sector. 
  14contrasted with 9.6% in the U.S.    The share of claims on institutional investors is highest for 
the U.K.; 52.2% of insurance and pension funds plus 5.1% of investment funds and unit 
funds.    For the similar claims, the share in Japan is among the lowest along with France and 
Germany.  The share of equities is very high for the U.S. (37.3%) and France (39.7%). For 
Japan the figure is surprisingly low at 8.1%. 
     Table 11 shows the portfolio composition of the households by income group based 
on Family Saving Survey.    Regardless of income group, time deposits are the major form of 
savings in Japan.  This trend is constant throughout the sample period 1979-1999.  
Relatively speaking, the richer households own a higher share of securities - in particular 
equities, while more insurance is owned by the middle income group.  Differences in 
portfolio composition among different income groups are very small.  In 1999, the 
composition of stocks and shares was 4.72% for the lowest income quartile, 6.06 % for the 
second, 5.35% for the third, 5.28% for the fourth and 7.86% for the highest fifth quartile.     
     The difference in the composition of stocks and shares is roughly matched by the 
difference in the composition of time deposits in the opposite direction ― 53.48% for the 
first, 47.46% for the second, 47.46% for the third, 44.22 % for the fourth and 44.75% for the 
fifth quartile.    Until 1989, the portfolio selection of the four groups from the first to fourth 
quartile was very similar, and the fifth quartile had a slightly different pattern; relatively high 
share of stocks and shares, and relatively low share of time deposits and insurance.  
However, even during this period, there is little difference among income groups. 
     Why do households in Japan prefer bank deposits?  A readily conceivable reason is 
the implicit protection of deposits by the government.  It is true in the past fifty years the 
government has adopted the convoy policy of protecting inefficient banks from bankruptcy腄
When some banks went bankrupt in the late 1980s, the government responded with perfect 
protection on deposits.
7    Although the government protection explains the choice for safety 
of deposits, this factor is insufficient as an explanation for high deposit shares because it lacks 
a reason for the preference for safe assets
8.    There are two reasons. 
          First, wealth distribution is highly equal in Japan, which implies that wealth held by the 
rich with a lower degree of risk aversion accounts for less.  According to Wolff (1996), in 
Table 12, the share of wealth held by the top five percent of the Japanese population is 25% 
in 1984.    This is less than half of the amount in the U.S.    In 1983 the same share of wealth 
held by the top five percent in the U.S. is 54% in gross assets, or 56% in net assets.    In terms 
                                                    
7  When the government finally adopted the policy of pay off through deposit insurance organization in 
April 2002, and partly abandoned the deposit protection policy, deposits shifted from small banks to large 
banks and postal savings.  Time deposits were converted into ordinary deposits for which pay off was 
postponed until April 2003. 
8  Of course, the lack of alternative attractive assets is another explanation for this phenomenon in the past.   
Until the 1980s, security market instruments were heavily regulated by the financial authority, and were not 
readily available as a store of value with a reasonable rate of return (Teranishi(1982) and Miller (1998)). 
  15of Gini coefficient, the figure of 0.52 in Japan is significantly lower than 0.77 (gross assets) or 
0.79 (net assets) in the U.S.    Even when comparing with other developed countries including 
France, Germany, Canada, and Australia, Japanese asset distribution is the most equal.     
     Second,  private financial  assets  in Japan  are mostly held by retirees who have obtained 
retirement severance payments and are now aging rapidly.  They prefer safe assets because 
of the increasing uncertainty in lifespan.    The speed of population aging in Japan is highest 
among all developed countries.  Moreover, recent theoretical examination has clarified that 
the share of investment in high risk assets such as stocks depends on wage earning capability, 
and other things being equal, the degree to afford risk is a decreasing function of age (Bodie, 
Merton and Samuelson(1992)).
9 
     For these two reasons, asset holders in Japan are significantly risk-averse compared 
with people in other countries.  The low degree of utilization of high-tech financial 
instruments by the Japanese financial companies is not necessarily due to the incapability of 
developing financial instruments, but due to the lack of investors who are willing to take 
larger risks.  This phenomenon explains why there is a high share of bank deposits in 
household assets.  Incidentally, the reasons for significant equality of wealth distribution 
could be traced back to the three incidents immediately after the war.    First, after the war, a 
hyper-inflation erupted which finally raised postwar price level 300 times higher compared 
with the prewar level.    This inflation has wiped out considerable part of financial assets with 
nominally fixed face value.  Second was the Zaibatsu dissolution and imposition of wealth 
tax (zaisan-zei).    Owing to these two measures most of the assets owned by wealthy families 
were confiscated and sold out to the public at low prices by the Security Coordination 
Liquidation Committee under the Occupation Army.  Equity sold out during 1946-47 
comprised 57% of total paid-in capital of corporate firms in the country.     
Third was the through-going land reform implemented during 1947-50.  All the 
arable land held by “non-resident” landowners were confiscated and sold out to landless 
farmers at a price less than one percent of the prewar price in real terms.  The second and 
third reasons eliminated almost all of the wealthy class existed in the prewar period (Teranishi, 
1993).  With this initial condition, wealth distribution of postwar Japan maintained extreme 
equality, partly owing to income sharing mechanism using internal labor markets and partly 
owing to high level of inheritance tax. 
          The fact that significant portion of the assets in Japan is held by retirees is illustrated in 
Table 13 based on the Family Saving Survey.  Important observations follow.  First, we 
look at the accumulation of assets by the age group over 65.    From 1979 to 1989, the assets 
of this group increased from 7,438 to 24,122, by 3.2 times, while average assets increased 
                                                    
9 Bodies and Crane (1997) examine Bodie, Merton and Samuelson model, using data of 1996 survey of 
TIAA-CREF participants and have an evidence that supports the hypothesis 
  16only by 2.5 times from 5,212 to 13,110 (Units in thousand yen).    Second, although there was 
the phenomenon of life-cycle saving or hump saving in 1979 for the age group 50 to 60 
(group of highest asset accumulation) and dissaving after age 65, this phenomenon 
disappeared after 1989 and thereafter asset level increases monotomically along with age. 
            In other words, Table 13 shows that the oldest age group has become the major asset 
holders in Japan since the mid-1980s.  Let us have a close look at the portfolio selection 
behavior of this age group.  By comparing 1979 and 1999, we know that the percentage 
share of time deposits has increased from 46.03% to 53.05%, while the average share of time 
deposits decreased form 47.18 to 46.83%
10  Moreover, the share of stocks and shares fell 
from 12.95% to 7.01%
11.  These facts suggest that retirees with high preference for safe 
deposits led the aggregate portfolio selection in Japan. 
          Incidentally, it is worth noting that unlike in the U.S., the baby boomers in Japan could 
not become the main player in the financial market.    Kitamura, Takayama and Arita (2001a) 
demonstrate that the baby boomers could not save as much as the previous generations in the 
prime age-income period (i.e. 50-60).  This is partly due to the fact that the baby boomers 
consist of the largest demographic group.  Firms and organizations could no longer afford 
to pay generous seniority wages to the boomer cohort as they did before.    Another reason is 
timing.    Unfortunately for the baby boomers, by the time they reach their 50s, they are stuck 
in the midst of the unprecedented 1990s economic recession.
12           
            Let us now discuss the low level of equity holdings.    This is especially clear when we 
compare Japan with the U.S., although Japan is the lowest among G7 countries (Table 8).  
Allen and Santamero (1998) argue that owing to the rise of participation costs, equity 
ownership has shifted from individual investors to institutional investors.  While we agree 
with this assertion, we want to draw attention to the fact that even in the year 1998 household 
in the U.S. held 23% of assets in the form of equity, and only 4% for Japan (Table 8).  We 
consider the difference to be rooted in the difference in wealth distribution (Table 7).    In the 
U.S., despite the rise of participation costs, a considerable number of wealthy individuals can 
afford to manage their stock investment by themselves, and to warrant the payment of fixed  
participation costs
13.  In this sense, the financial system of the U.S. is a mixture of 
                                                    
10 To be more precise, the share of time deposits fell sharply at the time the bubble burst in 1989 and 
regained later on. 
11  People in this age group increased stock holding during the bubble period 1984-1989 by 2.5 times from 
11.91% to 29.93%.  However, a similar behavior occurred with the other age groups.  In particular, the 
age group 55-59 increased the share by 3.3 times from 6.36% to 20.79%. 
12  Some economists argue that the bubble economy had to do with the baby boomers. Social contracts 
such as lifetime employment, seniority wage system, and generous pay-as-you-go public pension scheme 
could not be maintained for the baby boomers. 
13 Other researches report that the number of stocks held by the average asset holder is not large even in 
the U.S. (King and Leap (1984)) and that only a small portion (27.6% in 1984 survey of 2,998 families) of 
household owns stocks (Mankiew and Zeldes (1991)).  However, this fact does not necessarily preclude 
  17intermediation by institutional investors and individual investors, and corresponds to the 
south-west cell in Table 7.    In Japan, high participation costs and concentration of wealth by 
the retirees seem to imply that intermediated  ownership i n  a  s y s t e m  o f security market-based 
intermediation is the only way to accommodate and adjust to the shift in financial technology.   
 
 
3. 2 Failure of the Banking Sector in Risk Taking 
          After the bubble burst, the banking sector of Japan entered into prolonged stagnation 
and decline.  Saddled with huge non-performing loans (NPL), bank lending has continued 
to shrink in spite of the exceptionally low interest rate policy of the Bank of Japan.  Apart 
from the policy muddle which seems to have aggravated the NPL problem, there are two 
factors behind this phenomenon: financial technology and the changing nature of risks.     
          The first factor is related to financial technology development.    The banking sector in 
Japan seriously lags behind other countries in technological progress.  Owing to the rapid 
development of information and communication technologies, the securities markets are 
equipped with powerful mechanisms of risk management through the bundling, unbundling, 
and trading of risks.  Intense competition in the international bond markets, domestic 
security industry, and among institutional investors, has led to better financial technology.  
For example, the deregulation of bond markets in the 1980s ushered by the expansion of 
Euro-yen bond market gave incentive to traditional bank customers i.e. big businesses, to 
shift their funding from bank borrowings to bond financing.  Medium-term bond funds 
(chu-koku-funds) issued by security companies, have competed directly and effectively with 
bank deposits, owing to their liquidity and high yields.     
     With an increase in net financial wealth in the household sector, households 
increasingly want a higher share of their assets in the form of long-term, high-return and 
high-risk products, as their liquidity needs can be reduced to relatively small proportion of the 
portfolio.  Traditional banking services or products while maintaining a strong position in 
liquidity provision are inadequate for diversification and maximization of long-term 
investment returns.  The associated rise in demand for diversified financial instruments 
caused an increase of institutional investors, such as trust banks, insurance companies, and 
investment trust funds.    The banks responded to these challenges in three ways. 
          First, focus was shifted to off-balance-sheet and fee-earning activities.   Second, banks 
engaged in intensified cost-cutting.  Third, loans were extended to high-risk borrowers in 
order to maintain profitability.   High risk lending recipients include small and medium-sized 
firms as well as real estate related activities.  In principle, shifts to high risk and unfamiliar 
markets could be made without major increases to banks’ solvency risk if the associated 
                                                                                                                                                        
the existence of the large number of wealthy stockholders in the country.   
  18credit risk had been priced accurately and loan reserves had been built up accordingly.  
Institutional competition led to aggressive risk-taking on banks during the late 1980s, as they 
sought to maintain the profitability of their traditional lending business.  The major losses 
incurred in the 1990s suggest that risk pricing or quantity rationing was inaccurate.  
Although we do not delve into the issue why banks have failed to shift to new markets, there 
are two policy issues.   (i) Monetary policy did not adequately function to prevent the rise of 
the asset bubble, partly owing to the constraints related to international policy coordination.  
(ii) Past history of excessive bureaucratic intervention in the banking sector has deprived the 
sector of flexibility, and the sector continued the simple-minded strategy of scale expansion. 
     A s  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  f a c t o r ,  i t  i s  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  c h a n g e  f r o m  d i v e r s i f i a b l e  r i s k s  t o  
non-diversifiable risks has decreased the risk-function of the banks.  There are trends and 
cyclical elements in this phenomenon.  The globalization of the world economy and the 
consequent synchronization of the economic activity are two inevitable trends.     
     There is an important cyclical element in the pattern of risks.  Whenever there is 
basic innovation in industrial technology, systemic industrial risk tends to rise.  Japan has 
experienced a similar systemic risk in the 1920s and in the 1990s
14.   
     As the industrial structure shifted from light and indigenous industries (based on 
agriculture) to heavy and chemical industries in the 1920s, the industries tied by the 
input-output relationships went into difficulty simultaneously.    Risks related to each industry 
became highly correlated.    Also, the declining industries (i.e. light and indigenous industries) 
                                                    
14  Similarities exist between the financial crisis of the 1920s that lasted until the beginning of World War II, 
and in the financial crisis of the 1990s.  The financial crisis of the 1920s occurred when deflationary 
policies such as the lifting of the gold embargo were implemented.  After World War I, an asset bubble  
occurred and collapsed in the 1920s.    Then, just like now, the banks were burdened with bad loans, which 
led to the financial crisis in the spring of 1927.  To deal with the crisis, the Financial System Research 
Committee (Kinyu-seido Chosakai) was established to study the Banking Law in 1926. The law was 
promulgated in 1927.    The second asset bubble occurred in the late 1980s and collapsed in the early 1990s.   
The banking sector was burdened with huge amounts of non-performing loans (NPLs).  As a result, 
many banks and financial institutions went bankrupt in the 1990s.  At the same time, the Financial 
Deregulation Program “Big Bang” was announced in 1996 and implemented in 1999.    Under the current 
recession, the growth rate of bank lending has declined since 1990.  The rate has decreased to -4.7% in 
1997.  During the period of the financial crisis in the Showa era, the degree of credit contraction was 
more severe and lending by regional banks in 1934 contracted to 49% in 1926.  These two recessions 
resembled each other in terms of credit crunch, although the degree of credit contraction differed.  
During the 1920s financial crisis, the minimum capital requirement was raised in order to raise the net 
worth of banks under the Banking Law.  Similarly, the government today has tried to do the same by 
injecting the banks with public funds.  In conclusion, the two recessions share an important common 
point.    Both recessions occurred in periods of industrial and economic transitions.    The recession of the 
1920s occurred during the industrial transition from indigenous and light industries (agriculture and raw 
silk) to heavy industries.  In terms of resource allocation, the era was in transition from a liberal trading 
system that began during the middle of the Meiji period, to a controlled allocation system. The current 
recession has occurred in another industrial transition period: from heavy-industry-oriented economy to 
IT-based economy.  Looking at resource allocation, the current economic situation is in a transitional 
stage from the so-called Japanese economic system to a more market-oriented economic system. 
  19leveraged land as collateral and borrowed large funds from the banks.  Due to fear of 
corporate bankruptcy, the banks did not force the indebted firms to repay.  Consequently, 
banks were unable to fully recover their principle loans.   This scenario has been repeated in 
the 1990s as the Japanese industrial structure once again experienced a substantial shift from 
heavy industries to knowledge-based industries.
 15  
     Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) shows that under such conditions, a single shock on an 
industry has significantly persistent spillover effects over other industries.  A temporal and 
partial shock is turned into a systemic and macro shock, accompanied by a sharp fall of the 
value of the collateral, followed by a curtailment of bank lending.  We will provide detailed 
explanations in the next section.
16   
          When risk is cyclical in nature, the function of the banking sector could also be cyclical.     
When the nature of risks becomes systemic, the role of the banking sector would be 
diminished.  Conversely, banks can fulfill their risk-eliminating role when risks in the 
industrial sectors are idiosyncratic and diversifiable.  If we accept this as valid assumption, 
today’s loss of competitiveness in the banking sector might be considered to be a temporal 
phenomenon.   This may offer another explanation as to why the Japanese households hold 
bank deposits in such high proportions. 
         Nowadays, there seems to be a trend towards weakening the functions of the banking 
sector.  Prudential banking regulation raises the institutional cost of management in the 
banking sector and weakens its function.  In addition, market-oriented and globalized 
financial markets raise the cost of cross-shareholding. 
Let us argue that in both the 1920s and the 1990s, an unfavorable shock on a particular 
industry worked as a trigger, and spread the shock over the entire economy.    The trigger was 
responsible for the change in industrial structure.    It also caused an economy-wide decline in 
the value of collateral assets (i.e. land), which led to a credit crunch.  As a result, the risks 
faced by the banking sector became systemic and non-diversifiable. 
          The 1920s was a period of transition. The percentage share in net domestic production 
valued in current prices declined from 30.2% in 1920 to 17.6% in 1930.  The percentage 
share of food industry in total manufacture production (in current prices) declined from 
34.1% in 1910 to 25.0% in 1930.
17  In contrast, the composition of heavy and chemical 
industries (chemical, machinery, steel, and non-ferrous metals) increased from 20.9% in 1910 
                                                    
15 As mentioned earlier, in Japan the period of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a change in industrial 
structure from the heavy and chemical industries (based on the revolution in energy and material 
transformation) to new industries (based on the new technology for processing and transmitting 
information). 
16 Miller and Stiglitz (1999) give an interesting theoretical explanation for such a systemic risk situation in 
the case of an unexpected devaluation utilizing Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model. 
17  Within the light industry, the cotton textile industry was a highly competitive leading industry during the 
period, and it did not have any significant relationship with the domestic agriculture sector. 
  20to 32.8% in 1930.     
     What happened to the agricultural and light industries sectors?  First, agriculture 
productivity increase was stunted by the saturation of the high-yield rice production.    Then, 
rice import policy from the colonies depressed the domestic rice price.  Lastly, the Great 
Depression of the 1930s decimated the silk industry. 
     The shock on the agriculture sector had persistent and amplifying impacts on the 
whole indigenous and light industries. These industries depended heavily on agriculture as 
sources of materials, inputs, and for final demand.  Bank loans for these industries were 
highly collaterized on land -- 31.3% in local areas, in contrast to 9.0% in six large city areas
18.  
The percentage of lending collaterized on real estate was 16.2% for large banks.   For small 
banks with capital less than one million yen it was 38.3%.  Their customers comprised 
mainly of farmers, indigenous producers, and merchants.     
          Taking the year 1922 as 100, the land price index
19  went up from 49 in 1913 to 100 in 
1922, and fell to 62 in 1932.
20  Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) notes that when bank loans are 
tied to the collateral value, and when collateral assets are production factors, an unfavorable 
shock on a credit-constrained sector has persistent effects upon future periods.  This also 
has spillover effects on other sectors through a fall in collateral prices on credit limits. 
     We saw the same story in the 1990s.  Until the bursting of the bubble economy in 
1990, the Japanese economy was highly leveraged through the use of real estate as loan 
collateral.  Firms in the heavy and chemical industries used their large urban factory land 
holdings as collateral and enjoyed automatic expansion of credit as land prices went up.  
The banks fueled the speculative bubble through lending and raising credit limits in 
accordance with land price appreciation. The collapse of the bubble precipitated by the fall 
of land prices caused the severe credit crunch.  Since 27% of bank lending was 
collateralized with land as of 1990, the credit contraction hit the heavy and chemical 
industries most severely.  Land price index in the six largest city areas went up from 10.1 in 
1970 to 33.6 in 1985, up to 100 in 1990, and dropped to 44.9 in 1997.     
          There is no doubt that the Kiyotaki and Moore mechanism worked, making the credit 
crunch persistent and economy-wide.  Moreover, since the heavy and chemical industries 
tied up relation-specific investments, the spillover effect was exaggerated through the input 
output relationship.    Decline in credit limits of one firm influenced other firms through the 
depreciating land prices.  This in turn affected the input-output relationship through 
decreases in the demand side.  Negative shocks in the 1990s became systemic, and risks 
faced by the banking sector became more difficult to diversify. 
                                                    
18  Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Yokohama. 
19  Paddy fields. 
20  The lending practice of local banks, (whose credit limits were tied to land prices) and the subsequent 
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4.  New Direction of Changes in Japanese Financial Intermediation     
 
     So far we have argued that the development of IT has enhanced greatly the risk 
transferring (trading or redistributing) capability of financial markets.  At the same time, it 
has raised participation costs in the market to a level where average individual market 
participation is almost impossible.    It has also failed to reduce agency costs significantly due 
to information asymmetry between financiers and borrowing firms. 
     IT has helped to promote the role of institutional investors.  These investors can 
afford high participation costs and take advantage of sophisticated market-based financial 
instruments.  While these events have caused an outright decline of traditional banking 
businesses in many countries, this did not happen in Japan.   Households still prefer deposit 
instruments despite the banking sector being saddled with NPLs.  We have construed this 
paradoxical phenomenon by introducing two Japanese characteristics: equal wealth 
distribution and the retirees as main asset holders.   
            Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that the banking sector in Japan is near 
its risk-bearing limit.  This is evident in the recent shift of deposits from banks to postal 
savings account.  Therefore, it is unavoidable to introduce other measures to cope with 
non-differentiable risks, to transfer risks more extensively.  The  bank-based financial 
intermediation system should be replaced by a more secure market-based financial system.  
This does not necessarily mean that the security market-based financial system will be of the 
U.S. type, characterized by corporate controlled markets and dispersed corporate ownership.  
Instead, we argue that the new security market-based financial system will be characterized by 
security market-based intermediation i.e. intermediated shareholding, and corporate monitoring by 
institutional investors. 
      In this section, a detailed account on the limitation of risk bearing capability by banks 
will be given.    Then, we discuss three phenomena emerging in the Japanese financial system, 
which work towards security market-based intermediation.    They are characteristics of 
securitization, increasing share of institutional investors in corporate ownership, and 
emerging activism by institutional investors.   
 
4.1 Declining Functions of Banking Institutions   
As mentioned above, Japanese households prefer safety to return and liquidity in their 
asset selection. Even at the end of 1999, the share of safety assets in terms of cash and 
deposits was still exceptionally high compared with other developed countries (Table 10).  
                                                                                                                                                        
credit crunch throughout the 1920s and 1930s were related to the fall in the price of land (Shindo (1977)). 
  22From a historical viewpoint, traditional financial intermediation in Japan does not seem to 
have changed since the 1970s, although the size of the personal assets has increased more 
than 16 times in the past 30 years (Table 9).  Time deposits, (including bank deposits and 
postal savings) have consistently accounted for 40-50% of the personal assets.  Regular 
savings deposit account for around 30%.  In the 1980s, there was a temporary decline of 
both bank deposits and postal savings, but the speed of disintermediation was quite slow in 
comparison with other developed economies. 
Focusing on the 1990s, there are some noteworthy changes in intermediation. First, 
assets shifted from bank accounts to postal savings accounts.    This shift is due to distrust in 
the banks’ non-disclosure of NPLs
21, and due to a change in government regulation raising 
the upper limit of postal savings deposit per head
22. 
Second, in the 1990s, funds managed by institutional investors, which include trust funds, 
investment trust funds, and insurances, kept increasing.    Share of securities dropped sharply.   
In other words, direct holding of securities by households was replaced by indirect holding of 
risk-bearing funds.    This trend is caused by the aging society, where a large part of insurance 
and trust funds is related to the growth of the pension funds in the Japanese pension funds 
scheme.
23   
These facts show that the channel of funds from the personal sector to the corporate 
sector has partly switched from banking institutions to government and institutional 
investors.
24       
     With regards to the risk-bearing ability of banks, there are two major reasons for its 
weakness.  One is common to banking in general; the other is peculiar to Japan.  The 
common reason is financial globalization and progress of IT.  These two events contribute 
to the linkage of asset markets and the spread of information among investors, which in turn 
                                                    
21 Hanazaki and Horiuchi(1999) stresses that the Japanese banking crisis resulted from the delay in 
disclosing non-performing loans and the responses in managing them. 
22 The upper limit of postal savings per head was gradually raised from ¥3 million to ¥10 million during 
the period of 1988-1991.   
23 In Japan, institutional investors such as trust banks and insurance companies are trustee bodies of 
pension funds. The trustee bodies are legal shareholders of the companies they invest in. Their customer 
pension funds are real shareholders. 
24  This is not to say that Japan’s bank-based financial system characterized by financial intermediation, was 
shifting toward the securities market-based financial system supported by corporate control markets and 
dispersion of corporate ownership, all characteristics of the U.S. financial system. Japan’s financial 
intermediation linked broadly dispersed small funds with corporate investments through banking 
institutions.  Bank-based financial system has not changed in Japan, from a viewpoint of households or 
individuals, but the channels and catalysts have diversified. Hence, in the 1990s, functions of the Japanese 
banking institutions in terms of risk-bearing and information production, declined.  On the demand side 
of the funds, large firms that had strong relationships with banks, have dramatically diversified their 
financing since the 1980s.  The gap between the risk-bearing attitude of household and the risk-funding 
attitude of firms has widened further in the 1990s. The function of banks as intermediaries can no longer 
respond to the situation sufficiently. 
  23enhance correlated changes in different asset markets internally and externally.     
          To repeat, increased systemic risks reduce the role of the banking sector in diversifying 
risks.   The progress of IT in globalization has weakened the risk-bearing capability through 
the following two mechanisms.   
  The first mechanism is an increase in agency costs for banking institutions, or reduced 
confidence of depositors in the quality of deposits as a safe asset.
25  As financial 
globalization and progress of IT continue, it becomes more and more difficult for financial 
intermediaries to diversify risks within the organization.  Financial intermediaries must  
transfer risks, manage risks utilizing markets, and serve as vehicles for risk trading (Allen and 
Gale (1997)).  However, even if banking institutions implement strategies to transfer risks, 
they cannot manage risks sufficiently when the financial circumstances are frequently 
influenced by unexpected macroeconomic shocks.  The new vehicles and devices for risk 
management make monitoring bank management more difficult.   
The next mechanism is the increase in institutional costs shouldered by Japanese banks.   
Difficulty in risk monitoring contributes to banking instability, especially in the field of 
international business.  Measures to strengthen prudential regulations and steps to stabilize 
bank management produce new institutional costs.    There are also other obligations such as 
the need to strengthen disclosure regulations, to fulfill equity ratio requirements, and to satisfy 
balance sheet rules.   
The risk bearing capability of the banking sector in Japan was further reduced by 
additional factors in the 1990s.  One is the amount of NPLs in the banking sector.  The 
banking institutions chose to cut new lending in order to avoid additional risk rather than to 
promote disclosure and swift resolution of NPLs.    This worsened the banking problem.     
Second, the cost of shareholding by the banking sector increased.   The cost of cross 
shareholding within a corporate group or between banks and their corporate customers 
increased, owing to the stock market and real estate market slump.  A certain amount of 
stock holdings is allowed by the BIS capital adequacy accord to be included in equity.  The 
result was a smaller equity assets ratio due to large losses in shareholdings.   
The last factor is the transition from book value criterion to market value accounting 
system.  The transition revealed concealed losses in the book-valued accounts and reduced 
values of equity assets.   
In summary, the weakening risk-bearing ability of Japanese banking institutions in the 
1990s meant that the conditions, which have concentrated risks on the banking sector for a 
long time, were further eroded.  It is urgently needed to complement the risk bearing by 
                                                    
25 Ross (1989) classifies financial products based on transparency in asset management from a viewpoint 
of end users of markets. According to his classification, deposits are least transparent, mutual funds are 
most transparent, and pension funds are in between.   
 
  24banks with new efficient methods of risk trading.     
 
4.2 Securitization and Redistribution of Risk 
     Decline in functions of banks in terms of risk bearing and information production 
actually hampers management of risks in the economy through traditional intermediation.  
This causes two kinds of change in the financial system.   First, in order to avoid increasing 
costs and risks of traditional intermediation, existing financial intermediaries are inclined to 
shift their core activities from risk-bearing to risk-transferring.  By extending fee-earning 
businesses such as asset management and financial planning, they pass the risks to their 
customers.   
     Second, the need for risk redistribution creates demand for new financial instruments 
such as derivatives and securitized assets.  Securitization of future cash flows, in forms of 
loan sales and issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) -- which include mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) by broad definition, provides new facilities for risk management and risk 
trading. 
     From a microeconomic view, securitization provides new risk management measures 
for lenders, new financing vehicles for firms, and new risk assets for investors. From a macro 
economic view, securitization has two functions: the redistribution of risks and the 
unbundling of intermediation through markets.  Both improve financial intermediation 
efficiency.  Hence, securitization transforms the traditional financial system into a securities 
market-based system. 
Issuance of ABS of general loans and credits started in 1994, when the government 
lifted the ban on the issuance of asset-backed securities in the off-shore markets.  The 
development of securitization has accelerated since 1997, when Japanese banks suffered from 
the Japan premium in international markets, reflecting financial distress and bankruptcies of 
several financial firms.  The poor health of the banking institutions made the government 
realize the need for securitization legislation.  As a consequence, the Special Purpose 
Company Act in 1998, followed by the Special Services Law in 1999, was passed.  They 
enabled the Japanese financial institutions and non-financial firms to take advantage of the 
ABS markets.   Thereafter, securitization grew rapidly.   Sales of loan credit in the domestic 
market by city banks began in 1998.  The first ABS related to housing loans was issued in 
1999, and Housing Loan Corporation (government entity) issued ABS in 2001.   
According to the money flow data by the Bank of Japan, the securitization of general 
loans and credit jumped to approximately ¥10 trillion at the end of 1997 fiscal year and to 
¥12 trillion at the end of 1998 fiscal year.    According to a Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) 
report, the size of ABS issuance at annual base is estimated at having been ¥2.8 trillion in 
  252000.
26    The size of markets for securitized assets in Japan is the second largest in the world 
following the U.S.    However, the difference between the two countries is considerable, since 
the size of Japan is less than one-tenth that of the U.S.    In 1996, ABS in the U.S. amounted 
to 17.2 trillion yen and in Japan 0.08 trillion Yen, while those in 2000 are 25.6 and 2.06 
respectively (Akai (2001) based on estimation by Morgan Stanley).   
In conclusion, securitization did not occur spontaneously, nor did it progress in the 
private sector in response to demands for the transfer/redistribution of risks.  The 
government provided institutional and legal conditions for the securitization of loans and 
credits in the late 1990s, with the aim to restructure banks and other distressed financial 
institutions. In other words, the government initiated securitization from the supply side of 
assets, not from the demand side.     
A large part of ABS issuance is related to lease credits and consumer loans.  In 2001, 
lease and consumer credits respectively share 22.9% and 20.0% of total ABS issuance (Egawa 
(2001) based on CSFB estimation).
27 It is noteworthy that real estate related loans and 
housing loans grew in fiscal 2000 to account for more than one-third of the total issues.    In 
March 2001, the Housing Loan Corporation (a government finance company) issued its first 
ABS and announced it would continue to do so in the future.  As the Housing Loan 
Corporation still holds ¥70 trillion in loans, the potential for securitized assets seems very 
high.  In addition, real estate investment trusts (REITs) based on future cash flows from 
new development plans were listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in September 2001. 
On the other hand, the securitization of non-performing loans (NPLs) is still extremely 
limited.   According to Morgan Stanley, the share of NPLs in ABS issuance was only 1% in 
2000 and is estimated to be 3% in 2001.
28   NPLs in the banking sector have a close 
connection with the liquidation of real estate, since a large part of bank loans are 
collateralized by real estate.    Thus, securitization related to real estate is critical for improving 
Japan’s financial system efficiency, and for that purpose liquidation of real estate is a crucial 
precondition.  
     In general, development of securitization depends on the following conditions. (i) 
Proper estimation of risks of future cash flow.  (ii) Quality and costs of originators, 
servicers, and sellers.  (iii) Existence of investors who shoulder risks.  In the Japanese 
financial system, ambiguity in price formation of collateralized real estates and insufficient 
disclosure of NPLs are major reasons that hamper the development of securitization in 
reference to the first condition.  Transparency in price formation of real estate markets 
                                                    
26  These figures are almost the same as estimated by Morgan Stanley in Akai (2001). 
27  Other assets included in ABS are CDO (13.9%), housing loans (15.6%), real estate related assets (20.8%) 
and others (6.7%). 
28 These figures are taken from Akai (2001). ABS issues related to NPLs, all issued outside Japan, totaled 
¥20.44 billion in 1999 but ¥31.57 billion in 2000.   
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 29  
With regards to the demand for securitized assets, there are no appropriate channels to 
link personal assets with risk investments.    Households – which hold nearly 1,400 trillion yen 
in assets -- seem to offer huge potential for shouldering more risky assets.  Such a linkage 
would be desirable in the interest of efficient asset management to support the aging society. 
Looking at the recent financial service industry in Japan, some active strategies explore 
the household retail market.    Real estate investment fund that began in 2001 is one example.   
Regarding real estate-related financial products, the originators are real estate companies, 
which suffered large capital losses.  Servicers and distributors are securities companies and 
financial institutions, both badly hurt by the sluggish markets.  This poses the question 
whether securitization for individual investors is a desirable development. 
In view of the fact that the structure of new financial products is too complex for the 
general public to comprehend the risks involved, the following factors are necessary for the 
development of securitization involving individual investors: (i) disclosure of the credit risk 
attaching to original loans or future cash flows, (ii) sufficient accountability of suppliers for 
customers, and (iii) objective and appropriate information services which appraise the quality 
of the products on a continuous basis.
30 
Currently, it is highly questionable that these conditions for the retail market will be 
sufficiently realized.  It seems too simple to believe that financial institutions will be able to 
mobilize households to directly invest in such unfamiliar risky assets.  There are three 
important reasons why they may not invest: the participation costs of markets, income and 
wealth distributions, and the rapidly aging households, as already discussed. 
First in general, the participation costs of newly developed financial markets has 
increased significantly, while the transaction costs of traditional banking and securities 
services have fallen in line with the progress of IT.   
Second, income and wealth distributions significantly influence degree of risk aversion.    
The elderly in general prefer safe assets if other conditions are equal, as examined by Bodies, 
Merton and Samuelson (1992), and Bodies and Crane (1997).  In addition, participation 
costs to directly access securitized asset and other sophisticated new financial product 
markets are higher, even if they have large potential to bear risk.   
Third, the speed of aging of the population has strengthened the risk-averse nature in 
Japan, compared with other developed countries.  This is reflected in the prolonged 
economic slump and uncertainty for the future in the 1990s despite concern about return.
31 
                                                    
29  In 2001, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, embarked on a plan to improve real estate 
pricing and to create an efficient real estate market. 
30  Suto (2001) discusses problems related to securitization from the viewpoint of consumers. 
31 According to the results of ‘Questionnaire on Savings and Consumption in 2000’ (Kinyu Koho Chuo 
Iinkai), when considering asset selection, 37% of respondents put top priority on safety, which figure rose 
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professionals or institutional investors, such as banking institutions, pension funds, and others 
involved in asset management.  Creating opportunities for individuals to enter the market 
indirectly through the intermediaries is important, although the financial reform plan 
encourages the participation of individual and institutional investors alike.  Over emphasis 
on the direct participation of individuals in newly developed markets, such as derivatives and 
securitized products, may not promote efficiency in the financial system.
32 
In sum, there are two important points for development of securitization in Japan.  
One is to provide opportunities for households helped by professionals, to indirectly 
participate in the market.  In other words, the key is to extend securities market-based 
intermediation.
33  Here, institutional investors are major players, as agents of individuals, and 
would act to mitigate information asymmetry and technology gaps.     
The other point concerns consumer protection in financial markets.
34 To complete the 
Financial Big Bang from the consumer’s view, financial services law for function-based 
systematic consumer protection, and fiduciary responsibility legislation for pension funds and 
their trustee bodies are needed.  The idea of a U.K.-type comprehensive financial services 
law was partially realized in 2000 with respect to the sale of financial products.  Through 
revision of the Pension Funds Act in 2000, pension funds have to explicitly outline their fund 
management policy, but the Act is far from sufficient. 
Legal reform aiming to protect consumers should be given priority in the future 
development of securitization.  Otherwise, securitization will likely neither contribute to a 
more efficient financial system nor a more market-oriented system that is competitive 
externally and efficient internally. 
 
4.3      Corporate Governance and Intermediated Ownership 
     Another noteworthy change in the late 1990s is observed with respect to the 
ownership structure of listed companies. Table 14 shows that banking institutions (including 
commercial banks and long-term credit banks)
35 and business corporations increased 
shareholdings in the late 1960s to the 1970s.  Institutional investors, who are financial 
institutions running asset management business, kept increasing their shareholdings before 
the 1990s.    These increases stand in close contrast with the significant decrease in individual 
                                                                                                                                                        
to 54.8% in 2000. However, real asset allocation in the personal sector has slightly recovered since 1997.   
32  In order to develop securitization of cash flows, growth of private equity market in the form of limited 
partnership must be useful. Private capital market is broadly used by pension funds in the U.S. Other 
institutional investors contribute to help the management of start-up firms. (Prowse(1998)) 
33  Royama(2001) refers this sort of system as market-based indirect finance.   
34 Suto (2000) emphasizes the necessity of incorporating principles for the protection of consumers in 
Japan’s asset management industry. 
35  The figures should be slightly discounted because they include trusts accounts before 1986. 
  28shareholdings from 44.1% to 23.2% in 1990.   
Shares held by banks have declined sharply from 16.4% in 1990 to 10.1% in March 2001.   
For business corporations, their percentage of shareholdings remained the same until 1997.  
Cross-shareholding among corporations has unwound at a rapid pace because neither 
financial institutions nor corporations could shoulder the cost of long-term shareholdings 
against the background of declining stock prices
36.  
As far as individual shareholding is concerned, the direct shareholding by individuals 
recovered slightly in the late 1990s but plunged in March 2001, partly due to the rapid 
expansion of foreign investors’ shareholdings and an increase in institutional investments.  
Diminished confidence in the securities market has made the general public reluctant to hold 
shares directly.  Their preference lies in bank deposits and postal savings.  Thus, direct 
corporate ownership by individuals has been replaced by indirect ownership via institutional 
investors and foreign investors. 
Let us compare these changes in the corporate ownership structure with those of the 
U.S. and the U.K., both of which have typical securities market-based financial systems. From 
a long-term perspective, the retreating trend of equity investing by individuals and increase in 
equity holding by institutional investors is not peculiar to Japan. (Table 15)
37  It  is  particularly 
true for the U.K., where share investing by individuals decreased from 54% in 1963 to 15.3% 
in 1999.  In terms of significant differences in the level of ownership by institutional 
investors, the shareholding of institutional investors in the 1990s accounted for around 50% 
in the U.K. and the U.S., but less than 30% in Japan.  The crucial difference is not in the 
level of direct share ownership by individuals but in the level of intermediated ownership.  
          Institutional reforms of corporate pension funds started at the beginning of the 1990s.   
Similarly, the liberalization of the asset management business was almost completed in the 
late 1990s.  As a result, corporate pension funds raised their equity asset allocation 
dramatically.  According to the report by the Pension Funds Association (Kosei 
Nenkin-kikin Rengokai), corporate pension funds in 1999 invested 36.5% of their assets in 
domestic equities and 18% in foreign equities.  This increase more than doubled the figure 
during the last 10 years.  In 1989, the figures were only 15.1% and 6.8% respectively.  
Investment in equities or in risky assets as a whole surged since 1997, at the start of the 
financial reform.   
          In advance of the reform, some changes were observed following the Financial System 
Reform Law (effective as of April 1993).  This law was designed to promote competition 
                                                    
36 According to NLI Research Institute (1999),  share of stable ownership in the total ownership by 
financial institutions and business companies, including cross-shareholding and one-side shareholding, 
deceased from 41.1% 1n 1990 to 35.7% in 1997, p.47 Table 4. 
37 It should be noted that institutions in Table 15 include securities brokers, for it is difficult to separate 
securities brokers from institutions based on the data from the U.S. and the UK.     
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insurance companies), who are legal shareholders of pension funds, faced fierce competition 
from newcomers (investment advisers), with regard to performance and accountability of 
fund management.
38  
 Investment advisory companies have extended their market share dramatically in the 
1990s.    As providers of portfolio management information and of voting rights instructions 
on the companies they invest in, they have challenged the trust banks and insurance 
companies, which previously dominated the trustee business.  The intensified competition 
among trustee bodies and careful attention paid to pension funds by the portfolio managers 
has affected the corporate governance mechanism.     
Corporate pension funds and their trustee bodies acting as agents for private investors 
have become active shareholders in the companies they invest in.
39 A  questionnaire  regarding 
the changing attitude of institutional investors made by the Policy Research Institute of the 
Ministry of Finance
40  published in July 2001, shows that the trustees have begun to actively 
commit themselves to corporate governance.    Among 89 trustees (including trust banks and 
insurance companies) that have responded to the questionnaire, 68 (77.8%) thought they 
should exercise voting rights as agents of their customers, and 42 (47.7%) believed legislation 
concerning the fiduciary responsibility of pension funds was desirable.   Pension fund 
organizations show similar responses but they are less ambitious than the trustees.    In facts, 
28 (31%) trustees implemented some actions.    Twenty trustees (22.4%) executed the actions 
while voting at the general shareholders’ meeting. 
  In addition, 46 (51.7%) trustees surveyed questioned the monitoring ability of banking 
institutions.  They think institutional investors will likely replace banking institutions in the 
monitoring or the controlling of corporate management.
41 
          Institutional investors have become much more conscious of their fiduciary 
responsibility in parallel with the liberalization of asset management business. The 
background to this change has been the restructuring of the asset management regulatory 
framework since 1996.  The restructuring followed the accelerated deregulation of asset 
allocation by corporate pension funds.
42  In July 1998, the Pension Funds Association 
(Kosei-nenkin-kikin Rengokai) published a report that explicitly laid down principles 
                                                    
38  The ban on the entrance of investment advisers into trustee business was lifted in 1990. 
39  Regarding development of corporate governance in recent Japan, see Suto (2002). 
40  One of the authors organized the project.    For details see Omura, Suto and Masuko(2001). 
41 The respondents are requested to choose top three or less entities among twelve stakeholders, which 
might contribute to controlling the corporate management. Among 191 answers of 46 trustee bodies, 150 
answers are related to institutional investors.   
42  Since then, the asset allocation in corporate pension funds was strictly regulated by the 5-3-3-2 regulation 
whereby corporate pension funds must invest more than 50% of assets in loans and bonds, less than 30% 
in stocks, less than 30% in foreign assets, and less than 20% in real estate.   
  30underlying the fiduciary responsibility of pension funds for beneficiaries and contributors. 
Institutional investors in general and pension fund trustees in particular, have been forced to 
monitor the market value of financial assets to fulfill their responsibilities.     
 Judging from this fact, corporate governance system in Japan is shifting from the 
insider control system toward the outsider control system.  While the corporate pension 
funds are still dependent upon the companies, and that relationships between financial 
institutions and their corporate customers seem to affect the behavior of institutional 
investors, the trend towards the outsider control system in Japanese corporate governance is 
steady.  Nonetheless the speed at which the change is occurring is perhaps gradual in 
comparison with other developed countries
43.   
However, it is important to note that such a shift in corporate governance mechanism 
does not imply a transformation from relationship-oriented system to stylized market-based 
system, where a corporate-controlled market disciplines corporate management. Unless the 
equality of income and wealth distribution changes significantly, the Japanese financial system 
will continue to shift from bank-based financial intermediation, supported by the main bank 
system to a securities market-based intermediation, supported by institutional investors who are the 
agents of small investors or households.
 44   
     I n   securities market-based intermediation, intermediaries have to account for their customers 
as their agents on the markets they participate.    Communication with corporate managers to 
establish mutual confidence is crucial for institutional investors.  These investors act as 
agents for other investors and have the power to cause stock market volatility. Private 
investors aim to reduce monitoring and participation costs in the asset markets.  Therefore 
institutional investors must fulfill their role as monitors of corporate management.  They 
must be financially sophisticated in handling risk products such as securitized assets for their 
clients.  According to the questionnaire mentioned above, the trustees of pension funds 





                                                     
43  This sluggishness is partly due to the serious malfunctioning of the Japanese financial system as a whole                 
and partly due to the dependency on the old system or inertia. 
44  In October 2001, the implementation of a defined contribution pension plan (called Japanese 401k type 
defined contribution (DC)) was scheduled. It was expected to accelerate the intermediated ownership by 
financial institutions as agents of individuals.  When the corporate sector adopts the DC plan, financial 
intermediation will further shift toward a market-based system. However, the Japanese 401k plan is not fair 
in terms of the qualification of contributors, the upper limit of contribution, and the ambiguous portability 
among others.    It is partly because the overall of the Japanese pension system is under discussion that the 
DC plan is grafted onto the old framework.   
  315. New  Architecture  
 
     Let us think about the relationships between three types of institutions (individual 
investors, banks, and institutional investors) and the functions need to be fulfilled by each. 
     IT has improved risk transfer capabilities of the financial markets and promoted the 
development of sophisticated financial technologies, IT however has also increased 
participation costs.    Let us assume three things. (i) The Japanese society will keep the relative 
equality in income and wealth distribution in the future. (ii) Participation costs in the financial 
market transaction will remain high in the foreseeable future. (iii) When the industrial 
structural shift is completed, the risks faced by the financial system will be less systemic. 
     Against these facts, the following picture will emerge for the general direction in 
designing the new Japanese financial system.   
     First, households will continue to hold their financial wealth mainly in the form of 
claims on financial intermediaries.  Institutional reforms are indispensable in order to 
conduct an efficient monitoring of financial intermediaries i.e. banks and institutional 
investors.  For example, corporate pension funds must be more sensitive to the fiduciary 
responsibility of themselves as well as their trustees.  The monitoring role of depositors 
must be complemented by prudential regulations. 
     Second, the banking sector is expected to strengthen monitoring capabilities in its 
relationship loan business and other investments.  Retail banking with respect to venture 
firms and small and medium size firms is the main service for the industry.    IT has reduced 
transaction costs in lending.  It has lowered the barrier for market entry into the banking 
business for other firms from other non-bank related businesses.  As a result, market 
conditions in the banking sector are more competitive, contrary to the prediction by Boot and 
Thakor (2000).  Baba and Hisada (2001) argues that, with increased competition, the 
Japanese banks will devote more investments in improving their monitoring capabilities in the 
context of lender-customer relationship. 
        Third, institutional investors such as trust banks, insurance companies and investment 
advisory companies, must commit direct monitoring in the firms that they invest.  As 
shareholders, they are expected to exercise their voting rights and communicate with 
corporate managers.  Intermediated ownership must play an important role in the future 
architecture of the Japanese financial system.  Owing to the strong relationships among 
firms, it is difficult for the corporate pension funds to be vocal on the behaviors of firms 
whose stocks are held by the funds.  A conflict of interest may exist between sponsoring 
companies and the companies in which they invest.  It is more realistic and efficient to 
monitor companies through trustees (institutional investors) rather than direct monitoring by 
pension fund managers.  Of course, it is the top priority for the pension fund managers to 
fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities.  The pension fund managers should monitor their 
  32trustees to make sure fund management  p o l i c i e s   a r e   o b s e r v e d .           
With regards to the direction of policy reform in promoting individual investor 
participation in the capital markets, the Minister of Financial System, Hakuo Yanagisawa said 
it well.    He emphasized the importance of bringing 1,400 trillion yen held by the households 
into the capital markets directly as “money that dares to take risk” (July 24, 2001, Nikkei 
Shimbun).  This view comprises the backbone for the recent tax reform on equity 
transactions.  Such an idea has been the basis for the series of capital market reforms 
advocated by the deliberative council on security transaction since 1998 (Royama, 2001).  
Unless wealth distribution patterns and changes in participation costs are visible, it may be 
quite difficult for these arguments to obtain solid support.     
     Needless to say, it is not our intention to argue that the current state of equal income 
and wealth distribution should be maintained in the future.    Rather, we consider it necessary 
to allow ex post inequality to a considerate degree in the future.  However, such a 
conversion will involve changes in tax, social security, education, and the social safety 
networks.  Drawing a coherent plan to encompass these related areas is a prerequisite for 
success in reforming the financial system.         
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Let us discuss how non-diversifiable risks could be dealt with, taking the 1920s as an 
example.  Part of the risk appears to have been transferred cross-sectionally.  During the 
period, non-diversifiable risks occurred in the indigenous and light industries. Rich 
landowners, bankers and merchants absorbed a portion of the risks.    In order to understand 
this, we must take into consideration the very high degree of unequal wealth distribution in 
the prewar Japan.     
         We have a reliable list of rich asset holders from the year 1902 in Japan.    There were 
108 persons with personal wealth of more than five million yen (Teranishi (1982) p.188).
45  
The total of the assets held by the 108 individuals was 133.6 million yen.    In that same year, 
the total GDP in current price was 253.7 million yen, and total private financial assets were 
200.1 million yen (Fujino and Teranishi (2001)).  In other words, wealth held by the 108 
individuals amounted to 53 percent of the GDP.    Assuming that half of the wealth held by 
them comprised of financial assets, they controlled 33 percent of total financial assets of the 
economy.  Most of the wealthy could afford to offset the loss incurred in non-diversifiable 
risks within the indigenous sector by the income in the modern sector. 
     Another part of risk is rooted through inter-generational transfers, as emphasized by 
Allen and Gale (1997 and 2000).  Allen and Gale argue that the banking sector and other 
long-lived financial institutions in Japan, Germany, and France played the role of transferring 
non-diversifiable risks inter-temporarily.  The banks build up reserves of short-term risk 
assets when returns are high and run them down when returns are low, transferring risk from 
generation to generation.
46  In the case of prewar Japan, we have exact data of short-term 
asset holdings by financial institutions. 
            In Table A1, the category of banks comprises all ordinary, saving, and special banks.   
Private financial institutions include financial institutions for the small and medium-size 
businesses and agriculture, insurance companies, and trust banks.  The financial institutions 
include private and government financial institutions.  The treasury finance and investment 
system comprises of postal savings, postal annuities, the post office, life insurance, and the 
deposit bureau of the Ministry of Finance.  We have examined these three categories as to 
how non-profit institutions would be able to conduct inter-generational risk transfers as 
emphasized by Allen and Gale.
47   
                                                    
45 Personal wealth includes real estate holdings. Owners of zaibatsu are included in the richest strata: 
Hachirouemon Mitsui, Yanosuke Iwasaki and Hisaya Iwasaki are the richest three with 80 million assets 
each.  
46 As empirical evidences, Allen and Gale suggest two examples; (i)dissaving during the Great Depression 
and building up during the 1950s, and (ii) dissaving during the oil shock period and building up during the 
1980s. 
47 The role of the government might be very important in this regard.  During the 1950s, for example, 
  34T and P mean trough and peak of business cycles respectively, as identified in Fujino 
and Igarashi (1973).    Table A1 show the percentage ratio of liquid assets (cash, deposits, and 
gold and foreign exchanges) to total assets.    Let us examine the second column, the case of 
private financial institutions.  Two findings emerge. (i) In four out of five cases the ratio in 
peak (t) is higher than the ratio in trough (t + 1), implying dissaving in bad times.  (ii) In 
three out of six cases, the ratio in peak (+) is larger than that in trough (t – 1), implying 
building up of reserves.
48  These findings seem to be compatible with the hypothesis put 
forth by Allen and Gale.   With respect to the recession during the 1920s, the ratio of liquid 
assets accumulated during the WWI period (13.74% at the peak of 1918) was run down 
during the depression of the 1920s, reached the trough value of 8.55% in 1930, and was built 
up again during the recovery period, which reached 8.68% in 1938.  These facts suggest 
some sort of intertemporal smoothing of non-diversifiable risks during the 1920s in Japan.  
Although we have only focused on private financial institutions, such a phenomenon of 
intertemporal risk transfers could be found to a lesser extent, in the banking sector as well as 
in the private and government financial institutions. 
     It is necessary to note that the risk transfer function conducted by the above two 
measures ─ cross sectional and inter-generational transfers ─ have had a limited effectiveness 
in coping with the vast amount of undiversifiable risks by the banking sector.  Otherwise, 




                                                                                                                                                        
the Japanese government implemented powerful administrative guidance to increase the retained earnings 
in banks’ balance sheet through an intervention in various operating expenditures and dividend payout. 
48  In construing figures, one must note that there is a declining trend in the figure. 
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pp.433-451.  Table 1.    Regulated Handling Costs of Stock Transaction before Sept. 1999 
 
 
Site of Order  Apr. 1, 1977 – 
Apr. 14, 1985 
Apr.15, 1985 – 
Nov. 24, 1986 
Nov. 25, 1986 – 
Oct. 4, 1987 
Oct. 5, 1987 – 
June 3, 1990 
June 4, 1990 – 
March 31, 1994 
Apr. 1, 1994 – 
March 31, 1998 
April. 1, 1998 – 
Sept. 30, 1999 
less than ¥200,000  ¥2,500  ¥2,500  ¥2,500          ¥2,500 ¥2,500 ¥2,500 ¥2,500
less than ¥1 mil.  1.25%  1.25%  1.25%         
   
   
1.20% 1.150% 1.150% 1.150%
over ¥1 mil. to ¥3 mil.  1.05% + ¥2,000  1.05%+ ¥2,000  1.05% + ¥2,000  1.00%+ ¥2,000  0.900% + ¥2,500 
over ¥3 mil. to ¥5 mil.  0.95% + ¥5,000  0.95% + ¥5,000  0.95% + ¥5,000  0.90% + ¥5,000 
 
0.900% + ¥2,500 
 
0.900% + ¥2,500 
0.700% + ¥12,500 
over ¥5 mil. to ¥10 mil.  0.85% + ¥10,000  0.85% + ¥10,000  0.85% + ¥10,000  0.75% + ¥12,500  0.700% + ¥12,500 0.700%+  ¥12,500 0.575%+ ¥25,000 
over ¥10 mil. to ¥30 mil.  0.75% + ¥20,000  0.75% + ¥20,000  0.70% + ¥25,000  0.60% + ¥27,500  0.575% + ¥25,000 0.575%+  ¥25,000 0.375% + ¥85,000 
over ¥30 mil. to ¥50 mil.  0.65% + ¥50,000  0.65% + ¥50,000  0.50% + ¥85,000  0.40% + ¥87,500  0.375% + ¥85,000  0.375%+ ¥85,000 
over ¥50 mil. to ¥100 mil  0.60% + ¥75,000  0.55% + ¥100,000  0.30% + ¥185,000  0.25% + ¥162,500  0.225% + ¥160,000  0.225%+ ¥160,000 
over ¥100 mil. to ¥300 mil  0.45% + ¥200,000  0.200% + ¥185,000  0.200% + ¥185,000 
over ¥300 mil. to ¥500 mil.  0.35% + ¥500,000 
 
0.25% + ¥235,000 
0.125% + ¥410,000  0.125% + ¥410,000 
over ¥500 mil. to ¥1 billion  0.30% + ¥750,000  0.20%+ ¥485,000 
 
 
0.20% + ¥212,500 
0.100% + ¥535,000  0.100%+ ¥535,000 




0.55% + ¥125,000 








Source: Internal data of Nomura Security Co. Ltd. Table 2.    Average Handling Costs after Oct. 1999 (%) 
 
 
    2000 2001 2002 
    average median  average median  average median 
Transaction  volume           
1  million    1.077 1.150  1.094 1.150  1.089 1.150 
3  million    0.899 0.950  0.914 0.943  0.913 0.943 
5  million    0.855 0.893  0.868 0.890  0.866 0.886 
10  million    0.736 0.771  0.744 0.767  0.747 0.761 
30  million    0.572 0.593  0.573 0.590  0.580 0.590 
50  million    0.447 0.460  0.446 0.453  0.456 0.453 
0.1  billion    0.257 0.245  0.253 0.243  0.264 0.244 
0.3  billion    0.124 0.091  0.117 0.085  0.130 0.088 
0.5  billion    0.096 0.055  0.087 0.053  0.099 0.053 
1  billion    0.072 0.027  0.064 0.027  0.076 0.027 
 
Note:   (1) Survey data covering about 190 security companies conducted by Japan Security Association. 
(2) Average handling costs per transaction volume charged on customers for each size of transaction. 
Source:  Syoken gyouho, No. 589(March, 2000), 601(March, 2001), and 613 (March, 2002). Table 3.    Share of Financial Services Industry in GDP 
 
                                                                                 ( % )  
 Japan  U.S. 
1970 4.25  腜 
1971 4.67  腜 
1972 4.93  腜 
1973 4.94  腜 
1974 4.49  腜 
1975 5.22  腜 
1976 5.01  腜 
1977 4.88  腜 
1978 5.04  腜 
1979 5.15  腜 
1980 5.18  4.44 
1981 4.77  腜 
1982 5.17  4.25 
1983 5.45  4.83 
1984 5.27  4.49 
1985 5.30  4.80 
1986 5.43  5.04 
1987 5.79  5.45 
1988 6.02  5.65 
1989 6.36  5.62 
1990 5.94  6.13 
1991 5.56  6.59 
1992 5.24  6.76 
1993 4.86  7.29 
1994 5.18  6.80 
1995 5.04  7.13 
1996 4.72  7.26 
1997 4.98  7.83 
1998 4.86  8.06 
1999  腜  8.15 
Note:      Definition of financial service industry follows standard industry code of both countries, and comprises 
following sectors belonging to Finance and Insurance.  (1) Japanese financial services industry: banks 
including trust banks and foreign banks; credit agencies other than banks including small and medium 
financial agencies, agriculture and fishery agencies; financial companies; investment companies, securities 
and commodities brokers, services, stock exchanges; insurance companies. (Finance and Insurance 
Industry of Japan’ standard industry code).  (2) The U.S. financial services industry: banking; credit 
agencies other than banks; securities and commodity brokers, services; insurance carriers, agents, brokers, 
and services; holding and other investment companies. (They belong to Finance and Insurance Industry 
of the US standard industry code).   
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce.    Statistical Abstract of  the Unite States, each edition.     
Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet of Government of Japan. 
National Economic Accounts, each edition   
  Table 4.    Participation Cost related to Securities Analysts in Japan 
 
 




















of Analysts Per a 
Public Company   
Share of Analysts 
in Finance and 
Insurance Industry   
Share of Analysts 
in Employees of 
Securities Industry 
  A  B  C  D  E  A / B  A / D*100  E / C*100 
           (%)  (%)
1980 0   84402          
1981 241  1855 88736  1618000 54  0.130  0.015  0.063 
1982 682  1877 88883    154  0.363    0.173 
1983 845  1900 91016    191  0.455    0.210 
1984 924  1918 98649    209  0.482    0.212 
1985 1047  1956 105030    237  0.535    0.225 
1986 1129  2006 114191  1700000  255  0.563  0.066  0.223 
1987 1196  2063 126465    270  0.580    0.214 
1988 1407  2163 138851    318  0.650    0.229 
1989 1711  2282 149275    387  0.750    0.259 
1990 2268  2413 158601    513  0.940    0.323 
1991 3142  2537 156558  1939000  710  1.238  0.162  0.454 
1992 4623  2554 145300    1050  1.810    0.723 
1993 5815  2632 132646    1297  2.209    0.978 
1994 7241  2773 127533    1637  2.611    1.284 
1995 8502  2941 118811    1893  2.891    1.593 
1996 9433  3096 113028  1865000 2063  3.047  0.506  1.825 
1997 10857  3221  108072    2587  3.371    2.394 
1998 12177  3272  95193    2814  3.722    2.956 
1999 13528  3340  92065  1637000  3009  4.050  0.826  3.268 
2000 14561  3447  94717    3234  4.224    3.414 
              
 
Notes:   (1) Securities analysts certification was introduced to Japan in 1981. (2) Public companies include listed companies on the securities 
exchanges and registered companies to Japan Securities Dealers Association. (3) Financial services industry includes as follows: banks 
including trust banks and foreign banks; credit agencies other than banks including small and medium financial agencies, agriculture and 
fishery agencies; financial companies; investment companies, securities and commodities brokers, services, stock exchanges; insurance 
companies (Japan’ standard industry code). (4) A large number of security analysts work with financial institutions other than security 
industry.    Separate numbers of analysts in security industry can be found only after 1992.    The figures during the period 1981 – 1991 are 
estimated based on 1992 – 2000 average share of securities company analysts in the total number of analysts. 
Sources: The Securities analyst Association of Japan. 
        The  Japan  Securities  Dealers  Association,  Monthly Report, each edition. 
        T o k y o   S t o c k   E x c h a n g e ,   Fact book, each edition. 
        Economic  Planning  Agency  of  Government  of  Japan,  Annual Report on National Accounts, each edition 
        M i n i s t r y   o f  H e a l t h ,   L a b o r   a n d   W e l f a r e ,   Handbook of  Labor Statistics, each edition. 
 Table 5.    Participation Cost Related to Securities Analysts in the United States 
 
 












of Analysts Per a 
Public Company 
Share of Analysts 
in Employees of 
Finance and 
Insurance 
  A  B  C  A / B  A / C*100 
     (%) 
1980 6449    4289000  腜  0.150 
1981 6789    腜  腜  腜 
1982 7258  5624  腜  1.291  腜 
1983 7650  6273  腜  1.220  腜 
1984 8306  6432  4732000  1.291  0.176 
1985 8879  6460  4859000  1.374  0.183 
1986 9515  6788  腜  1.402  腜 
1987 10464  7222  腜  1.449  腜 
1988 11306  7028  5373000  1.609  0.210 
1989 12405  6873  5475000  1.805  0.227 
1990 13618  6765  5582200  2.013  0.244 
1991 14999  6839  5556000  2.193  0.270 
1992 16602  7016  5580000  2.366  0.298 
1993 18587  7840  5570000  2.371  0.334 
1994 20150  8296  5632000  2.429  0.358 
1995 21917  8588  腜  2.552  腜 
1996 23990  9214  5772000  2.604  0.416 
1997 26891  9305  5949000  2.890  0.452 
1998 30488  8952  5770000  3.406  0.528 
1999 35343  8623  5965000  4.099  0.593 
2000 41105  8361  腜  4.916  腜 
 
Notes:  (1) The number of certified security Analysts is CFA chartered Awards. (2) Public companies include NYSE listed companies, 
AMEX listed companies and NASDAO registered companies (3) The Financial services industry includes as follows; banking credit 
agencies other than banks; securities and commodity brokers services; insurance carriers, agents, brokers, and services; holding and 
other investment companies. (Finance and Insurance Industry for the US standard industry code). 
Source:    The U.S .Bureau of the Census, Country Business Patterns, Annual editions. 
http://www.aimr.com.  Securities  Industry  Association,  SIA Report, each edition. 
New York Stock Exchange, Fact Book, each editions. 
Nasdaq Market Data on NASD Web Site, the Nasdaq Stock Market Fact Book, each edition. 
 Table 6.    Cost of MBA School (US dollar) 
 
 
   
Annual Tuition  Pre-MBA  
Medium Pay 
Past – MBA 
Medium Pay 
Pennsylvania(Wharton) 27,120  60,000  156,000 
Northwestern(Kellogg) 28,677  55,000  142,000 
Harvard 28,500  65,000  160,000 
 
Note:      Top 3 best business school of the year 2000. 
Source:  Survey  of  Business Week. 
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 Table 8.      Household Sector Balance Sheets (Proportions of Gross Financial 
Assets) 
 
1970 1980 1990 1995 1997 1998
Change
1970-1998
United Kingdom Deposits 0.34    0.43    0.31    0.22    0.22    0.21    -0.13     
Bonds 0.07    0.07    0.01    0.02    0.01    0.01     -0.06      
Equities 0.24    0.12    0.12    0.15    0.17    0.15     -0.09      
Institutions 0.23    0.30    0.48    0.51    0.53    0.55    0.31      
United States Deposits 0.28    0.33    0.23    0.16    0.14    0.13    -0.15     
Bonds 0.13    0.10    0.11    0.10    0.07    0.06     -0.07      
Equities 0.36    0.21    0.14    0.22    0.24    0.23     -0.12      
Institutions 0.22    0.28    0.39    0.42    0.47    0.50    0.28      
Germany Deposits 0.59    0.59    0.48    0.43    0.40    0.40     -0.19      
Bonds 0.08    0.12    0.16    0.16    0.14    0.13    0.06      
Equities 0.10    0.04    0.07    0.05    0.08    0.09     -0.01      
Institutions 0.15    0.17    0.21    0.29    0.30    0.32    0.17      
Japan Deposits 0.55    0.69    0.60    0.60    0.62    0.60    0.04      
Bonds 0.06    0.09    0.09    0.05    0.03    0.02     -0.03      
Equities 0.12    0.07    0.09    0.06    0.05    0.04     -0.07      
Institutions 0.14    0.13    0.21    0.29    0.31    0.28    0.14      
Canada Deposits 0.31    0.38    0.36    0.32    0.30    0.30     -0.01      
Bonds 0.14    0.08    0.05    0.06    0.05    0.04     -0.09      
Equities 0.27    0.24    0.21    0.25    0.28    0.30    0.03      
Institutions 0.22    0.21    0.28    0.30    0.32    0.34    0.13      
France Deposits 0.49    0.59    0.38    0.35    0.32    0.29     -0.20      
Bonds 0.06    0.09    0.04    0.05    0.03    0.02     -0.03      
Equities 0.26    0.12    0.26    0.23    0.29    0.32    0.07      
Institutions 0.06    0.09    0.26    0.33    0.32    0.31    0.26      
Italy Deposits 0.45    0.58    0.35    0.28    0.23    0.23     -0.22      
Bonds 0.19    0.08    0.19    0.21    0.22    0.18     -0.02      
Equities 0.11    0.10    0.21    0.21    0.25    0.30    0.19      
Institutions 0.08    0.06    0.08    0.10    0.10    0.10    0.02      
Average Deposits 0.43    0.52    0.39    0.34    0.32    0.31    -0.12     
Bonds 0.10    0.09    0.09    0.09    0.08    0.07    -0.04     
Equities 0.21    0.13    0.16    0.17    0.20    0.21    0.00     



























Source:    National flow-of-funds balance sheet data.    Davis and Steil (2001), Table 1.9.Table 9.    Financial Assets of Personal Sector (1970-1998) 
 
(%: fiscal year)
 1970 1980 1990 1995  1998
   
Cash and Deposits  57.3 62.8 52.3 55.1 59.6 
    Cash  and  Demand  Deposits  15.4 11.4  8.8 10.0 12.3 
    Saving  Deposits  41.9  51.4  43.5  45.1  47.3 
         Banking  Time  Deposits  32.0  33.9  29.2  27.1  27.1 
         Postal  Savings  Deposits  9.9  17.5  14.3  18.0  20.2 
          
Managed  Funds  19.3 20.8 31.6 34.7 32.9 
    Trust  Funds  5.2  6.0  6.8  6.6  5.1 
    Investment  Funds  1.6  1.5  3.9  2.7  2.3 
    Insurance  12.5  13.3  20.9  25.4  25.5 
          
Securities 21.0  15.7 14.7 10.1  7.5 
    Bonds  5.4  8.3  4.8  3.1  2.1 
    Stocks  1/  15.6  7.4  9.9  7.0  5.4 
          
Others  2.7 0.8 1.4 0.1 0.0 
          
Total                        %  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
                        ¥trillion  78.3  353.1  954.5  1183.0  1255.1 
   
Note :  (1) Market value. 
(2) Data aggregation base was changed in 1999. 
Source:  Bank of Japan, Annual Report of  Economic Statistics. 
 Table 10.    Financial Assets of Personal Sector (as of end - 1999) 
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Source:    Bank of Japan, International Comparative Statistics.   Table 11.    Portfolio Composition of the Households by Yearly Income Quintile 
Group (All Households) 
1979 (thousand Yen)
Item
Savings 5,212 (100.00%)  2,564 (100.00%)  3,290 (100.00%)  4,091 (100.00%)  5,372 (100.00%)  10,735 (100.00%) 
Demand deposits 598 (11.47%)  372 (14.51%)  408 (12.40%)  474 (11.59%)  623 (11.60%)  1,116 (10.40%) 
Time deposits 2,459 (47.18%)  1,277 (49.80%)  1,618 (49.18%)  1,959 (47.89%)  2,490 (46.35%)  4,946 (46.07%) 
Life insurance &
non-life insurance
1,024 (19.65%)  566 (22.07%)  758 (23.04%)  926 (22.64%)  1,165 (21.69%)  1,707 (15.90%) 
Securities 945 (18.13%)  322 (12.56%)  395 (12.01%)  531 (12.98%)  841 (15.66%)  2,636 (24.56%) 
   Stocks & shares 445 (8.54%)  68 (2.65%)  130 (3.95%)  197 (4.82%)  344 (6.40%)  1,483 (13.81%) 
Non-financial
institutions
185 (3.55%)  27 (1.05%)  111 (3.37%)  201 (4.91%)  253 (4.71%)  330 (3.07%) 
1984 (thousand Yen)
Item
Savings 7,697 (100.00%)  4,550 (100.00%)  4,908 (100.00%)  6,360 (100.00%)  8,159 (100.00%)  14,507 (100.00%) 
Demand deposits 620 (8.06%)  423 (9.30%)  446 (9.09%)  543 (8.54%)  684 (8.38%)  1,003 (6.91%) 
Time deposits 3,706 (48.15%)  2,421 (53.21%)  2,539 (51.73%)  3,129 (49.20%)  3,928 (48.14%)  6,510 (44.87%) 
Life insurance &
non-life insurance
1,690 (21.96%)  1,030 (22.64%)  1,192 (24.29%)  1,626 (25.57%)  1,847 (22.64%)  2,757 (19.00%) 
Securities 1,442 (18.73%)  635 (13.96%)  635 (12.94%)  864 (13.58%)  1,347 (16.51%)  3,728 (25.70%) 
   Stocks & shares 602 (7.82%)  238 (5.23%)  138 (2.81%)  280 (4.40%)  542 (6.64%)  1,810 (12.48%) 
Non-financial
institutions
239 (3.11%)  41 (0.90%)  96 (1.96%)  199 (3.13%)  353 (4.33%)  508 (3.50%) 
1989 (thousand Yen)
Item
Savings 13,110 (100.00%)  7,487 (100.00%)  9,116 (100.00%)  10,223 (100.00%)  12,726 (100.00%)  25,996 (100.00%) 
Demand deposits 895 (6.83%)  618 (8.25%)  687 (7.54%)  801 (7.84%)  884 (6.95%)  1,486 (5.72%) 
Time deposits 4,999 (38.13%)  3,548 (47.39%)  3,427 (37.59%)  4,204 (41.12%)  5,119 (40.22%)  8,698 (33.46%) 
Life insurance &
non-life insurance
3,114 (23.75%)  1,900 (25.38%)  2,399 (26.32%)  2,678 (26.20%)  3,422 (26.89%)  5,170 (19.89%) 
Securities 3,752 (28.62%)  1,370 (18.30%)  2,399 (26.32%)  2,204 (21.56%)  2,844 (22.35%)  9,942 (38.24%) 
   Stocks & shares 2,335 (17.81%)  681 (9.10%)  1,056 (11.58%)  1,123 (10.99%)  1,479 (11.62%)  7,336 (28.22%) 
Non-financial
institutions
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 1994 (thousand Yen)
Item
Savings 15,921 (100.00%) 11,478 (100.00%) 13,009 (100.00%) 12,760 (100.00%) 15,451 (100.00%) 26,908 (100.00%) 
Demand deposits 1,043 (6.55%)  774 (6.74%)  860 (6.61%)  901 (7.06%) 1,051 (6.80%) 1,630 (6.06%)
Time deposits 7,585 (47.64%) 6,041 (52.63%) 6,706 (51.55%) 5,403 (42.34%) 7,259 (46.98%)  12,517 (46.52%)
Life insurance &
non-life insurance
4,420 (27.76%) 3,003 (26.16%) 3,649 (28.05%) 4,203 (32.94%) 4,477 (28.98%) 6,770 (25.16%)
Securities 2,376 (14.92%) 1,466 (12.77%) 1,528 (11.75%) 1,752 (13.73%) 2,110 (13.66%) 5,023 (18.67%)
   Stocks & shares 1,145 (7.19%) 578 (5.04%) 583 (4.48%) 627 (4.91%) 952 (6.16%)  2,986 (11.10%)
Non-financial
institutions
466 (2.93%) 136 (1.18%) 256 (1.97%) 465 (3.64%) 536 (3.47%) 936 (3.48%)
1999 (thousand Yen)
Item
Savings 17,377 (100.00%) 12,787 (100.00%) 13,309 (100.00%) 15,556 (100.00%) 17,281 (100.00%) 27,953 (100.00%) 
Demand deposits 1,751 (10.08%) 1,403 (10.97%) 1,214 (9.12%) 1,652 (10.62%) 1,654 (9.57%) 2,832 (10.13%)
Time deposits 8,138 (46.83%) 6,839 (53.48%) 6,316 (47.46%) 7,383 (47.46%) 7,641 (44.22%)  12,510 (44.75%)
Life insurance &
non-life insurance
5,026 (28.92%) 3,356 (26.25%) 3,871 (29.09%) 4,836 (31.09%) 5,622 (32.53%) 7,442 (26.62%)
Securities 2,033 (11.70%) 1,131 (8.84%) 1,764 (13.25%) 1,404 (9.03%) 1,789 (10.35%) 4,075 (14.58%)
   Stocks & shares 1,071 (6.16%) 604 (4.72%) 806 (6.06%) 833 (5.35%) 912 (5.28%)  2,198 (7.86%)
Non-financial
institutions
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 Source:  Family  Saving  Survey  (Statistics Bureau), respective years. Table 12.    International Comparisons of Wealth Distribution 
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Item Average   -24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
11.47 15.15 13.33 13.57 11.12 11.17 10.99 10.30 10.96 11.52 13.20
47.18 65.37 49.56 49.38 48.73 47.51 44.84 46.70 47.89 47.01 46.03
19.65 13.85 22.07 21.87 21.29 24.13 20.36 18.23 18.60 16.76 14.83
18.13 2.65 8.59 9.33 13.45 13.14 20.08 21.20 20.24 23.61 24.58
8.54 0.00 3.70 3.84 5.59 5.32 12.33 10.77 8.39 7.49 12.95
3.55 2.91 6.51 5.78 5.41 4.05 3.75 3.56 2.30 1.10 1.36
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(thousand Yen) 5,212 1,545 1,921 2,991 3,903 4,269 5,767 7,948 7,899 8,652 7,438
1984 (%)
Age
Item Average   -24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
8.06 15.38 9.27 8.67 8.19 8.54 7.97 7.52 8.03 7.15 8.41
48.15 36.25 50.64 51.26 47.00 43.51 49.96 45.80 48.79 50.42 49.85
21.96 31.62 23.18 25.03 26.01 27.91 24.75 23.43 18.96 17.35 14.96
18.73 10.40 8.70 9.37 13.72 15.59 14.55 19.69 21.26 24.06 26.23
7.82 0.00 1.56 3.10 5.42 7.19 7.09 10.69 6.36 7.52 11.91
3.11 6.28 8.21 5.70 5.07 4.43 2.77 3.57 2.95 1.03 0.55
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(thousand Yen) 7,697 1,385 2,826 4,003 5,225 6,022 8,008 9,389 10,891 12,427 11,306
1989 (%)
Age
Item Average   -24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
6.83 14.80 10.07 8.19 7.65 7.64 6.81 7.64 7.61 5.84 5.56
38.13 43.60 40.11 38.50 38.49 37.57 35.93 41.53 35.78 44.98 34.78
23.75 24.31 25.76 31.45 31.50 30.79 30.97 26.35 22.65 21.94 13.22
28.62 11.47 19.26 15.79 16.56 20.22 22.80 21.96 30.86 25.81 45.77
17.81 10.20 10.25 8.23 9.53 13.05 13.16 14.01 20.79 13.37 29.93
2.67 5.81 4.80 6.04 5.79 3.78 3.50 2.51 3.09 1.43 0.66
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(thousand Yen) 13,110 1,892 4,518 5,211 7,583 9,210 12,005 13,176 16,997 21,016 24,122
Demand deposits
Time deposits
Life insurance & non-
life insurance
Securities






Life insurance & non-
life insurance
Securities






Life insurance & non-
life insurance
Securities





Item Average   -24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
6.55 13.87 13.13 9.15 7.65 7.66 7.06 6.27 6.79 5.89 5.65
47.64 49.92 37.24 43.36 39.56 43.63 42.57 42.63 47.63 51.75 53.76
27.76 33.91 26.63 33.37 37.10 35.44 36.01 30.26 28.63 25.32 18.79
14.92 0.15 14.71 7.89 10.34 8.50 11.66 16.61 13.29 14.38 20.62
7.19 0.15 10.43 2.63 5.73 4.73 5.61 8.35 7.81 6.86 8.75
2.93 2.14 7.58 6.22 5.02 4.60 2.57 4.19 3.36 2.29 1.06
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(thousand Yen) 15,921 1,961 4,630 6,658 8,431 11,047 12,817 16,309 18,808 24,772 25,461
1999 (%)
Age
Item Average   -24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
10.08 40.08 18.42 19.20 12.12 10.84 10.19 9.27 9.72 8.70 9.75
46.83 37.34 44.16 32.70 37.54 35.96 41.35 43.41 46.08 50.00 53.05
28.92 22.27 31.49 38.08 36.28 41.09 34.69 33.17 31.12 27.92 21.09
11.70 0.00 3.36 4.71 8.29 7.22 9.80 10.54 9.74 12.17 15.39
6.16 0.00 1.54 2.27 4.59 4.84 6.05 5.66 6.14 6.77 7.01
2.47 0.31 2.54 5.30 5.76 4.90 3.98 3.60 3.34 1.21 0.72
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(thousand Yen) 17,377 1,280 3,897 6,620 8,698 11,375 13,247 18,256 21,227 24,621 25,271
Savings
Time deposits
Life insurance & non-
life insurance
Securities








Life insurance & non-
life insurance
Securities
     Stocks & shares
Demand deposits
Source:    Family Saving Survey (Statistics Bureau), respective years. 
 

















1966 11.8        16.0        - 12.3        3.7        7.2        18.6        44.1        1.8        100.0
1970 14.0        16.5        - 15.1        1.4        3.2        23.1        39.9        3.2        100.0
1980 17.7        18.9        - 17.4        1.5        3.9        26.0        29.2        4.0        100.0
 
1990 16.4        27.1        6.2        17.3        3.6        3.5        25.2        23.2        4.2        100.0
1991 16.3        26.9        6.5        17.2        3.2        3.1        24.5        23.2        5.4        100.0
1992 16.2        27.0        6.8        17.0        3.2        2.5        24.4        23.7        5.5        100.0
1993 16.0        26.6        7.1        16.5        3.0        2.5        23.9        23.5        6.7        100.0
1994 15.9        26.6        8.0        16.0        2.6        2.2        23.8        23.6        7.4        100.0
1995 15.4        24.9        8.0        14.8        2.1        2.6        23.6        23.6        9.4        100.0
1996 15.1        25.1        8.8        14.3        2.0        2.1        23.8        23.6        9.8        100.0
1997 14.6        24.6        9.7        13.5        1.4        1.8        24.1        24.6        9.8        100.0
1998 14.0        24.3        10.5        12.6        1.2        1.7        24.1        25.4        10.0        100.0
1999 12.8        22.1        9.3        11.2        1.6        2.1        23.7        26.4        12.4        100.0
2001 10.1        29.9        n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 21.8        19.4        18.8        100.0
Notes:    Number of units since 1986, number of shares before 1986. 
(1)  Banking institutions include long-term credit banks and commercial banks since 1990. They include trust accounts before 1986. 
(2)  Institutional investors include trust banks, insurance companies and investment funds.  Other financial institutions include 
securities companies etc. 
(3)  Institutional investors of 2001.3 include all expect banking institutions. 
Source:    Tokyo Stock Exchange, Fact Book, 2001. 
The figures in March 2001 are from Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2001/06/27. Table 15.      Ownership Structure of the US, the UK, and Japan 
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 Table A1.    The Ratio of Liquid assets to Total Assets of Financial Institutions 
 
 
Year Business  Cycle Banks  Private Financial 
Institutions 
Private and Government 
Financial Institutions 
1891 T 12.29  12.24  12.12 
1896 P  8.83  9.56  9.03 
1902 T 10.57  11.04  10.39 
1905 P 12.61  12.98  12.41 
1909 T 11.41  11.85  11.94 
1911 P 10.16  10.67  10.13 
1913 T  9.47  10.13  9.87 
1918 P 12.80  13.74  14.96 
1921 T  9.20  10.13  10.36 
1924 P  8.55  9.94  10.27 
1930 T  7.23  8.55  8.65 
1938 P  6.83  8.68  7.74 
 
Source:    Calculated from the flow of fund estimates in Fujino and Teranishi (2001). 
 